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WARRANTLESS INVESTIGATIVE SEIZURES AND SEARCHES 
OF AUTOMOBILES AND THEIR CONTENTS AND OCCUPANTS 
Steven G. Davison * 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the prohibition under the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution I of any search or seizure that is unreasonable2 
has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as generally 
requiring police to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search or 
seizure,3 numerous exceptions to this rule have been recognized4 when 
the "exigencies of the situation" make a warrantless search or seizure 
"imperative. "5 Warrantless seizures and searches of automobiles6 have 
been permitted by the courts in a number of situations. Warrantless 
·B.S., 1968, Cornell University. J.D., 1971, Yale University. Professor of Law, University of 
Baltimore School of Law. Member, Colorado Bar. 
I. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CaNsT., amend. IV. 
2. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). 
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
4. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
5. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
6. Certain inspections and examinations of automobiles and their contents do not constitute a 
"search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. For the conduct of govern-
mental agents to constitute a fourth amendment "search" or "seizure," the conduct must violate a 
person's actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. This subjective expectation of privacy must be 
one that the court believes society recognizes as "justifiable," "reasonable," or "legitimate." 
United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (use of electronic "beeper" to monitor movement of 
automobile on public streets and highways held not to be a fourth amendment search); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register device, which records the numbers dialed by a 
telephone but does not intercept the contents of telephone conversations, held not to be a fourth 
amendment search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (interception of contents of a per-
sons's conversation on a telephone in a public telephone booth, by placing an electronic listening 
device on the outside of the booth, held to be a fourth amendment search). If police conduct is not a 
fourth amendment search or seizure under this two-pronged test, such conduct is not subject to the 
warrant, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
Whether particular police conduct violates a justifiable, reasonable or legitimate expectation of 
privacy is determined to a great extent by the subjective judgment of a judge deciding a particular 
case. See W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 2.1-2.7 
(1978). It should be noted, however, that in making this determination the Supreme Court has con-
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sidered facts that establish that members of the public may have knowledge or reason to know that 
police or other persons may engage in the type of conduct that is being challenged as a search or 
seizure. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735. In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether 
members of the public would know or have reason to know whether a telephone company records 
telephone numbers dialed on a person's telephone in determining whether such conduct by a 
telephone company at the request of the police constituted a fourth amendment search. The Court 
did not limit its inquiry to whether members of the public would know or have reason to know that 
the police would record the numbers dialed from a person's telephone. But if a person's justifiable, 
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy is violated by the conduct of private persons and not 
by the conduct of governmental agents, the fourth amendment is not implicated. See C. 
WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS § 
4.02 (1980). The Supreme Court has not, however, decided whether public opinion surveys or expert 
testimony indicating whether members of the public would consider particular conduct by police or 
other persons to violate a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy, can be or 
should be considered by a judge in determining whether such conduct is a fourth amendment search 
or seizure. 
Because tlie determination of whether a particular type of police conduct violates a justifiable, 
reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy is to a great extent a subjective judgment by the 
judges deciding a particular case, judges often disagree as to whether a particular type of police con-
duct violates a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy. E.g., compare United 
States v. Shelby, 573 F .2d 971 (7th Cir. 1978), and People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 
486 P.2d 12~2 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409U.S. 33 (1972), a/I'd, 8 Cal. 3d 623,105 Cal. Rptr. 
521, 504 P .2d 457 (1973) (disagreement as to whether inspection of trash that has been set out on the 
curb of a public street is a fourth amendment search). 
Under this two-pronged test for defining a search or seizure, courts hold that police do not 
engage in a fourth amendment search when they look through a window of an automobile that is in a 
public place and observe what is inside the automobile, e.g., Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188 (4th 
Cir. 1973), !!ven if the observations are made in the evening or night with the aid of a flashlight. E.g., 
State v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 215 N.W. 2d 535 (1974); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th 
Cir. 1970). A search may be held to occur, however, if police open the door of an automobile and 
observe its contents, Tyler v. United States, 302 A.2d 748 (D.C. App. 1973), break into and enter a 
locked automobile and inspect its interior and contents, State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170,622 P. 
2d 1199 (1980), or trespass onto private property and observe the interior and contents of an 
automobile that is parked within the curtilage. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 
1974). A fourth amendment search, however, may not occur if police, although trespassing onto 
private property, are in an "open field" area rather than within the curtilage when they look into the 
interior of an automobile. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Air Pollution Variance 
Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). 
Police have also been held not to engage in a fourth amendment search or seizure when they 
examine the exterior of an automobile that is located in a public place and take a small sample of the 
automobile's paint and an impression of the tread of a tire mounted on the automobile. Cardwell v. 
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
On the other hand, no fourth amendment seizure or search occurs if police impound and inspect 
the interior and contents of an automobile that has been abandoned. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, 
§ 2.5(a). 
Furthermore, even if police conduct in impounding and inspecting an automobile constitutes a 
search or seizure that violates one person's fourth amendment rights, such conduct may not violate 
the fourth amendment rights of other persons. A defendant in a criminal trial has standing to 
challenge the admissibility of information obtained or items seized by police on the grounds that the 
information or items were obtained as a result of ail illegal search or seizure only if the illegal search 
or seizure violated his own personal fourth amendment rights (by violating an actual and legitimate 
expectation of privacy). A person cannot, however, challenge the admissibility of items or informa-
tion obtained by police in violation of a third person's constitutional rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128 (1978) (a passenger in an automobile that he does not own generally does not have standing 
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searches of automobiles are permitted when voluntarily consented7 to 
either by the automobile's owner or by another person with common 
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the automobile. 8 
under the fourth amendment to challenge a search of that automobile and the seizure of items that he 
does not own); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant in a criminal trial does not 
have standing under the fourth amendment to challenge the admissibility of evidence taken from a 
third person through an intentional violation of that third person's fourth amendment rights). Cf. 
United States v. Posey, 663 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1981) (defendant had "standing" to challenge search of 
automobile and seizure of guns discovered in an automobile owned by his wife because he was 
exercising exclusive control over the automobile pursuant to her permission at the time of the 
search, even though he admittedly had no property interest in either the automobile searched or the 
guns seized). 
In addition, although evidence obtained either directly or indirectly in violation of a person's 
fourth amendment rights will not be admissible as evidence at that person's criminal trial under the 
exclusionary rule, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), or under the corollary "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 
(1975), such evidence may be admissible in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338 (1974), and in a civil administrative proceeding. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (state prisoner may not bring federal habeas corpus 
suit alleging that evidence admitted at his state criminal trial was inadmissible because obtained in 
violation of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, when state prisoner had full 
and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in the state courts). 
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, under which 
an illegally-obtained item is not suppressed if the police officers who seized the item were acting in 
good faith and under a reasonable, although mistaken, belief that their actions were lawful. United 
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 
(1981). This Fifth Circuit exception is applicable both when police make an error of judgment con-
cerning the existence of facts establishing probable cause and when police rely on a statute later held 
to be unconstitutional, a warrant later held to be invalid, or a court decision that is subsequently 
overruled. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 840-46. But in order for this Fifth Circuit exception 
to apply, the prosecution must establish both the existence of actual, bona fide good faith in the 
police officers in question at the time of the disputed search and seizure, and the reasonableness of 
this good faith on an objective basis. Id. at 843. This exception was justified on the grounds that the 
cost to society of freeing a gUilty person outweighed any slight deterrence of illegal acts by individual 
police officers that would result from excluding evidence obtained by police officers acting in good 
faith.ld. at 840. See United States v. Alvares-Porras, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981). Cf. Abell v. Com-
monwealth, 221 Va. 607, 272 S.E.2d 204 (1980). In a recent case, the Supreme Court, on its own 
motion, ordered the parties on reargument to address the question of whether the exclusionary rule 
"should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982). The Court in Gates, however, ultimately 
decided the case on other grounds, declining to address the question of whether a "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule should be adopted because the issue had not been presented to or 
addressed by the state courts below and no factual record relevant to this question had been 
developed in the state courts below. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
The Supreme Court might recognize a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule on the 
grounds that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter similar unlawful police conduct in the 
future, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and that this purpose is not furthered significantly by 
excluding evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment by police who were acting in good 
faith. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
7. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
8. Statev. Farrell, 443 A.2d438 (R.I. 1982). Cf. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
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Automobiles lawfully impounded by the police may be searched without 
a warrant when the search is conducted pursuant to standard police pro-
cedures and for the purposes of safeguarding the owner's property and 
protecting the safety of the police and public. 9 There also exists some 
authority indicating that automobiles may be seized and searched 
without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe that the 
automobile is evidence of a crime. 10 The courts have also permitted war-
rantless seizures and searches of automobiles and their contents under the 
"automobile exception" (also called the "Carroll doctrine" II), which 
permits a warrantless seizure and search of an automobile and certain of 
its contents when police have probable cause to believe that it contains 
seizable items and circumstances make the obtaining of a warrant 
impracticable. 12 In the last twelve years, the United States Supreme 
Court has decided a number of cases involving the automobile 
exception. 13 In two recently decided cases, Robbins v. California l4 and 
United States v. Ross, I' a deeply divided Court addressed the issue of the 
permissible scope of a search of luggage and other containers discovered 
in an automobile lawfully searched under the automobile exception. In 
New York v. Belton, 16 a case decided at the same time as Robbins, the 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, adopted a rule separate from and inde-
pendent of the automobile exception. This is aper se rule permitting the 
warrantless search of the interior of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile and of containers found therein when incident to the lawful 
arrest of the occupants of the automobile. The Supreme Court also 
recently held that police, when conducting an investigation of an 
automobile that has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation or that 
has been involved in an accident, may make a warrantless search of areas 
of the passenger compartment of the automobile and containers therein 
in which a weapon could be placed or hidden, if the police possess a 
reasonable belief that a non-arrested suspect is potentially dangerous and 
may gain immediate control of a weapon. 17 
9. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1976). 
10. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.3(a). 
11. See infra note 150. 
12. See infra notes 150-321 and accompanying text. 
13. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980); Robbins v. California, 
453 U.S. 420 (1981); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. 
Ct. 3079 (1982); Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). 
14. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
15. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
16. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
17. Michigan v. Long, 51 U.S.L.W. 5231 (U.S. June 28, 1983). See infra note 145. 
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This article will analyze exceptions to the general rule requiring a 
warrant for the seizure and search of an automobile and its contents and 
occupants, giving particular attention to Robbins, Ross, and Belton. 
I. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES INCIDENT TO 
LAWFUL ARRESTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
In the 1981 case of New York v. Belton, 18 the Supreme Court for the 
first time explicitly addressed the issue of whether an automobile can be 
searched by police without a warrant simply because an occupant of the 
automobile has been lawfully arrested. 19 At issue in Belton was whether a 
warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under the Chimel v. 
Calijornia20 exception to the general fourth amendment rule. 
The Chimel exception permits police, without a warrant, to search 
the area adjacent to a person lawfully arrested if the arrestee could lunge 
or grasp for a weapon or for evidence that could be destroyed. 21 In 
Chimel, after police had arrested the defendant in his home-an arrest 
the Court assumed was lawfuF2-the police searched the entire home and 
discovered incriminating evidence. This evidence was introduced at the 
defendant's trial on two charges of burglary, and he was convicted. Over-
ruling two earlier cases23 that would have permitted the warrantless 
search of the defendant's entire home, the Court held that a lawful war-
18. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
19. See infra notes 59-149 and accompanying text. 
20. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
21. Id. at 763. 
22. Id. at 755. 
23. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 
(1950). Harris had held that the warrantless search of the entire residential premises where the defen-
dant had been lawfully arrested was a lawful search incident to the defendant's lawful arrest. 
Rabinowitz had upheld, as a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest, an extensive warrantless 
search of a one-room business office. Prior to Harris, however, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (l932)-cases which 
neither Harris nor Rabinowitz explicitly overruled-the Supreme Court had held unlawful the war-
rantless searches of the offices where the defendants had been lawfully arrested and the warrantless 
seizure of evidence in the offices. The holdings in Go-Bart Importing Co. and Lefkowitz were based 
on the Court's findings that the arresting officers had had sufficient information and time to obtain 
a search warrant and that the areas searched and items seized were not visible and accessible and 
were not in the arrestee's immediate custody. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. at 
358; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 565. Furthermore, in Trupiano v. United States, 334 
U.S. 699 (1948), a case decided subsequent to Harris and prior to Rabinowitz, the Court held that 
the warrantless seizure of an illicit distillery found at the site where one defendant was lawfully 
arrested was unlawful and could not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest, because the 
arresting officers had had more than enough time to obtain a warrant authorizing seizure of the 
distillery. Trupiano distinguished Harris on the grounds that in Harris the police knew in advance of 
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rantless search incident to a lawful arrest includes only the person of the 
arrestee24 and the area" 'within his immediate control' ... from within 
the search where seizable evidence would be found. Rabinowitz, however, overruled Trupiano to the 
extent that it required a search warrant based solely upon the practicality of procuring it rather than 
upon the reasonableness of the search after the lawful arrest. In Chimel v. California, the Supreme 
Court attempted to resolve the "divergent results" which had been reached in "various factual 
situations." 395 U.S. at 760 n.4, citing other cases where "divergent results" were reached in 
"various factual situations." 
24. 395 U.S. at 762-63. This statement was technically dictum, because in Chimel no search of 
the defendant's person occurred at the time of his arrest. 
Subsequently, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
U.S. 260 (1973), the Court explicitly held that police, without a search warrant, may fully search the 
person of an individual they have lawfully arrested for the purposes of seizing any weapons on his 
person in order to take him into custody and preserving any evidence on his person for later use at 
trial. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. The Court in these two cases held that a 
warrantless search of the person of an individual lawfully arrested can be made every time a 
person is lawfully arrested and taken into custody to the police station. United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. at 234-35. (The reasons for adoption of this rule are discussed infra notes 84-86 and 
accompanying text.) 
This rule applies regardless of the triviality of the offense for which a person is arrested. Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 263-64. (In Gustafson, the defendant was arrested after being lawfully 
stopped for failure to have his vehicle operator's license in his possession. In Robinson, the defen-
dant was arrested after being lawfully stopped for driving after revocation of his operator's permit 
and for obtaining an operator's permit by misrepresentation.) The right to search the person of one 
lawfully arrested also does not require probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that the arrestee 
is armed or has evidence on his person. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235; Gustafson v. 
Florida, 414 U.S. at 266. The Court also held that the police have the right to search the person of 
one lawfully arrested even when the nature of the offense for which the person is arrested makes it 
unlikely that the arrestee possesses a dangerous weapon, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234, 
and even though there is no evidence that could be found on the arrestee's person relevant to the 
offense for which the person is arrested. 414 U.S. at 233; Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 265. The 
Supreme Court in Gustafson also held that the lawfulness of a search of the person of an individual 
lawfully arrested does not depend upon whether the arresting officer is required by police regula-
tions to take an arrestee into custody or whether there are police regulations or policies which 
establish the conditions under which a full-scale body search can be conducted. 414 U.S. at 265. (The 
Court, however, left open in Robinson the question of whether a warrantless search of the person of 
an arrestee will be upheld if the arrest was a mere "pretext" for the search. 414 U.S. at 221 n.!. See 
infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.) 
The Court in these two cases also held that a search of an arrestee's person is not limited to a frisk 
(pat-down of a person's exterior clothing), United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227-29, which can 
only take place when police have a reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and presently 
dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). An officer conducting a frisk 
can reach inside a person's exterior clothing only when he feels an item that he reasonably believes is 
a weapon; in such a case he only can reach inside that person's clothing to seize the item he believes is 
a weapon and cannot make a full-scale search of the individual's person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I 
(1968). The Court in Robinson held that the search of an arrestee's person is not subject to the limita-
tions of a frisk on the grounds that "it is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far 
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and 
transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from 
the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for pur-
poses of search justification." 414 U.S. at 234-35. The only limits that the Supreme Court has 
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imposed on the scope of a search of an arrestee's person are that a body search cannot be extreme or 
patently abusive in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forcing enemetic solu-
tion through tube into stomach of arrestee to induce vomiting of swallowed drugs held to violate due 
process clause). 
In Robinson and Gustafson the Court also appeared implicitly to authorize police to open any 
containers that they find on an arrestee's person and to seize and further investigate the contents of 
such containers. See Robinson v. California, 414 U.S. at 236 (warrantless inspection of crumpled-up 
cigarette package, and warrantless testing of 14 gelatin capsules containing white powder found in 
package (later determined to contain heroin), upheld as search incident to lawful arrest); Gustafson 
v. Florida, 414 U.S. at 266 (warrantless opening of cigarette box, and seizure of marijuana cigarettes 
found inside box, upheld as search incident to lawful arrest). Subsequently, in United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 15 (1977), the Supreme Court indicated that personal property "immediately 
associated with the person" can be searched without a warrant when incident to the lawful arrest of 
that person. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 
460-61, discussed infra notes 52, 59-149 and accompanying text. Chadwick appears to allow police 
to open containers immediately associated with the person and found on an arrestee's person 
without a warrant even though the police have gained exclusive control of the container, People v. 
De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838, 385 N.E.2d 577 (1978), and even though the police do 
not have probable cause to believe that the container contains items that have a nexus with criminal 
activity, such as fruits, instrumentalities, evidence of crime, or contraband. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967). Thus, by appearing to authorize the police to seize the contents of containers 
found on an arrestee's person even without probable cause to believe that the contents have a nexus 
to criminal activity, Chadwick, Robinson and Gustafson, implicitly create an exception to the 
"immediately apparent" requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine, which requires police, 
when they first discover an item for which they were not searching, to have probable cause to believe 
it has a nexus with criminal activity in order to seize the item without a warrant. See infra note 57. 
Some lower courts, however, have prohibited police from opening an opaque, closed container 
found on an arrestee's person and from seizing and further investigating its contents unless police 
have probable cause to believe that the container contains items having a nexus with criminal activ-
ity. State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). Contra United States v. Simpson, 453 F.2d 
1038 (lOth Cir. 1972); Wright v. Edwards, 343 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1972). 
One reason for the holdings in Robinson and Gustafson that a search of an arrestee's person 
can occur in all cases when the arrest is lawful and that the search's legality does not depend upon the 
individual circumstances of each case is that "[aJ police officer's determination as to how and where 
to search the person of a suspect whom he arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the 
Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step 
in the search." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. The Court also supported this rule on the 
grounds that "a custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under 
the fourth amendment," and that, therefore, "a search incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification . . . because it is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority 
to search. . . ." I d. 
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the warrantless search of an arrestee's person can 
take place prior to the actual arrest if the arrest follows "quickly on the heels" of the challenged 
search of the arrestee's person and provided that probable cause for the arrest is not based upon 
items found on the arrestee's person during the search that occurred prior to the arrest. Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Although not stated, the reason for this rule is probably to protect the 
arresting officer's safety if the person being arrested happens to be armed with a weapon and 
attempts to use it while the officer is placing him under custody. Cf. Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853, 
856 (7th Cir. 1965) (' 'To hold differently would be to allow a technical formality of time to control 
when there has been no real interference with the substantive rights of a defendant. ") Similarly, the 
Supreme Court also has indicated that the warrantless search of an arrestee's person can take place 
at the police station prior to or shortly after the incarceration of the arrestee. United States v. 
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). Cf. Illinois v. Lafayette, 51 U.S.L.W. 4829 (U.S. June 20, 1983) 
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which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.,,25 
The Court in Chimel explained that the reason for allowing a search of an 
arrestee's person and the area within his "immediate control" is to 
remove any weapons that the arrestee "might seek to use to resist arrest 
or to affect his escape," to avoid endangering the officer's safety and 
frustrating the arrest,26 and to prevent the arrestee from concealing or 
destroying evidence. 27 The Court further stated that "a gun on a table or 
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the 
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. 
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's per-
son and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase 
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon 
or destructible evidence.' >28 
In Chimel, however, the Court made it clear that a "lunge or grasp" 
area search is limited to the area immediately adjacent to the spot at 
which the defendant is arrested. 29 The police, for example, cannot arrest 
(without a warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion, police may seize, examine, and inven-
tory the contents of any container or article in the possession of a person under lawful arrest when 
that person is being booked and jailed at a police station-house in accordance with routine and 
established administrative procedures, for the purposes of protecting an arrestee's property from 
theft, protecting police from false claims of theft, discovering dangerous instrumentalities in an 
arrestee's possession, and verifying or ascertaining an arrestee's identity). 
Of course, a person must have been lawfully arrested in order for the police to have the author-
ity to make a warrantless search of his person. If the arrest is unlawful, any items found on the 
arrestee's person will be excluded as evidence at the arrestee's criminal trial pursuant to the exclu-
sionary rule. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 6.02. 
25. 395 U.S. at 763. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. In a subsequent case, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,14-15 (1977), discussed 
infra notes 36-58 and accompanying text, the Court stated in dictum that a search of an arrestee is 
also for the purpose of protecting persons other than the arresting officers, and that a warrantless 
search under Chimel of the area within an arrestee's immediate control can be made "whether or not 
there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested may have a weapon or is about to destroy 
evidence. The potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items 
within the 'immediate control' area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate 
the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved." 433 U.S. at 14-15. (Earlier 
in the same opinion, the Court similarly stated that "when a custodial arrest is made, there is always 
some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or 
destroyed." Id. at 14.) This approach is the same as that applicable to the search of an arrestee's per-
son. As noted earlier, the person of an arrestee can be searched in every case regardless of whether 
the officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has a weapon or evidence 
on his person, and regardless of how trivial or minor the offense for which a person is arrested. See 
supra note 24. 
29. The Court stated that "there is no comparable justification ... for routinely searching any 
room other than that in which an arrest occurs .... " 395 U.S. at 763. Cf Washington v. Chrisman, 
455 U.S. 1(1982). 
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a person in his living room and then march that person through his home, 
searching areas adjacent to his path. Furthermore, the area within which 
the police can properly search is limited to that within which the arrestee 
can physically lunge or grasp.30 
The Chimel Court also made it clear that the scope of the area that is 
within an arrestee's immediate control (and, therefore, that can be 
searched without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest) depends upon 
"the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case."3! A 
number of factors are considered by a court in making this determina-
tion, 32 including the relative number of arrestees and arresting officers at 
the place where the arrest occurs,33 the extent to which the arrestee is 
physically restrained at the time of the search of the area,34 and the 
physical size, strength, and skills ofthe arrestees compared to those ofthe 
arresting officers. 35 
In a subsequent case, United States v. Chadwick, 36 the Court placed 
limitations on the right of police to open without a warrant and search 
pieces of personal luggage discovered during a lawful search of the area 
within an arrestee's immediate control. 37 In Chadwick, federal narcotics 
30. In Chimel, the Court made this clear by referring to the area "in front of one who is 
arrested," 395 U.S. at 763, and the area within the reach of the person arrested, id. at 766; and by 
approvingly discussing, at 395 U.S. at 763-64, the Court's earlier decision in Preston v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). The Court in Chimel approvingly quoted language in Preston to the 
effect that a warrantless search of an automobile, after its occupants had been taken to jail and the 
automobile had been towed to a garage, could not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest, 
because the search was remote from the place and not contemporaneous with the time of the arrest. 
376 U.S. at 367. 
In Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 14, the Court stated in dictum that a search under Chimelpermits a 
"prompt" search of the area within an arrestee's "immediate control." The Chimel Court did not 
discuss the question of whether a search of that area may occur prior to when the individual actually 
is arrested. The Court subsequently held that the person of an arrestee may be searched without a 
warrant prior to his being arrested. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). See supra note 24. 
31. 395 U.S. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950». 
32. See generally, W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 6.3(c). 
33. E.g., United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); Peoplev. Williams, 57 Bl.2d 239, 
311 N.E.2d 681 (1974). 
34. Most courts hold that the area of immediate control is very limited when the arrestee's 
hands are cuffed behind his back at the time of the search of the area adjacent to him. E.g., United 
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Boca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969). 
Some courts, however, hold that the fact that an arrestee has his hands cuffed in front of him does 
not prohibit the police from searching the area adjacent to the arrestee. E.g., United States v. Jones, 
475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973). 
35. For example, the area within an arrestee's immediate control should be very small when the 
arrestee is unconscious, quadraplegic, or paraplegic and not in a wheelchair. 
36. 433 U.S. I (1977). 
37. In Chadwick the Court did not itemize the types of containers and other items found on 
an arrestee's person subject to its holding. See supra note 24 and infra. notes 55-56 and accom-
panying text. 
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agents lawfully arrested three persons and seized a footlocker in their 
possession. The agents had probable cause to believe that the footlocker 
contained contraband marijuana or hashish. The arrestees were taken to 
a federal building, and the footlocker was taken to another part of the 
building. Subsequently, federal agents opened the locked footlocker 
without a warrant and seized a large amount of marijuana. 
The Court in Chadwick determined that the warrantless opening of 
the footlocker could not be upheld under the fourth amendment as a 
Chimel search of an area within an arrestee's immediate control. The 
Court concluded that the fourth amendment protected the owners of the 
footlocker against unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures, 38 
because they had manifested an expectation that the contents would 
remain free from public examination by placing the contents inside a 
double-locked footlocker. 39 
The Court then rejected the government's argument that the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement protects only private homes, business 
offices, and private communications. It also rejected the argument that 
searches of containers are reasonable under the fourth amendment 
if there is probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct 
is present. 40 
38. The Court's opinion in Chadwick did not address the issue of whether all three arrestees 
had standing to challenge the legality of the warrantless opening of the footlocker. See supra note 6. 
The Court also stated that the fourth amendment "protects people from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." 433 U.S. at 7. Thus, the Court 
implicitly found that the opening of the locked footlocker was a fourth amendment search. (A 
search occurs when police conduct violates a person's actual and legitimate expectations of privacy. 
See supra note 6. If police conduct is not a fourth amendment search, such conduct is not subject to 
the warrant, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Smith v. 
Maryland, 443 U.S. 735 (1979». 
39. Although Chadwick's reference to double-locking the trunk could be interpreted as requir-
ing such manifestations of privacy in order for a container to be protected by the fourth amendment, 
the Court in United States v. Cleary, 656 F .2d 1302, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1981), held that such a reading 
of Chadwick would be incorrect in light of the subsequent decision in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
753 (1979), analyzed infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text. In Cleary the Court noted that 
Sanders, in including an unlocked suitcase within the category of personal property protected by the 
fourth amendment, "did not rely on the types of precautions that indicate a subjective expectation 
of privacy (i.e., double-locking) found in Chadwick. Rather, the critical factor relied on was the 
objective nature of the suitcase as personal luggage, i.e., the inherent nature of the container itself 
rather than the behavior of its owner." 656 F.2d at 1304. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
Cleary was implicitly modified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), which held that the 
fourth amendment protects any container, whether "worthy" or "unworthy" (see infra note 224), 
the contents of which are not open to plain view, regardless of whether there are any subjective 
manifestations of privacy. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text. 
40. 433 U.S. at 6-7. The Court rejected these arguments, stating that the warrant clause of the 
fourth amendment' 'does not in terms distinguish between searches conducted in private homes and 
1983) WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AUTOMOBILES 11 
The Court further determined that the warrantless search of the 
footlocker could not be upheld under any of the exceptions to the rule 
generally requiring a warrant for a search or seizure, and that it thus 
violated the fourth amendment. The search was also determined not to be 
a lawful search incident to arrest under the Chimel immediate control 
doctrine. The Court pointed out that law enforcement officers had 
reduced the footlocker "to their exclusive control," with the result that 
there was no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the 
footlocker to seize a weapon or destroy evidence. 41 The Court stated that 
the footlocker's mobility was not sufficient to justify dispensing with the 
"added protections" of a warrant once federal agents had the footlocker 
under their exclusive control, because there was not' 'the slightest danger 
that the footlocker or its contents could have been removed before a valid 
search warrant could be obtained. "42 Furthermore, "once law enforce-
ment officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not 
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive 
control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain 
access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of 
that property is no longer an incident of the arrest. "43 The Court did, 
other searches," and that the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures "draws no distinctions among 'persons, houses, papers, and effects'." [d. at 8. The Court 
determined that when a fourth amendment issue is presented the fundamental inquiry is whether or 
not a search or seizure is reasonable under all the circumstances, although it noted that a judicial 
warrant serves an important role in assuring that the search or seizure is reasonable. [d. at 9. Chad-
wick concluded its rejection of the federal government's arguments by stating that' 'a fundamental 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government inva-
sions of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of the 
home." [d. at 11 (footnote omitted). Cf. United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844 (U.S. June 20, 
1983) (police, when they have reasonable suspicion (not amounting to probable cause) that personal 
luggage contains narcotics, may briefly detain the luggage without a warrant to quickly confirm or 
dispel their suspicion by exposing the luggage to a dog trained to detect the presence of narcotics 
(without opening the luggage or inspecting its contents». 
41. 433 U.S. at 15. The Court also refused to extend the automobile exception (see infra notes 
150-321 and accompanying text) to permit warrantless searches of luggage and other personal prop-
erty in public places. The automobile exception was held to authorize warrantless searches only of 
motor vehicles and other inherently mobile objects, because their inherent mobility "often makes 
obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable," because of "the diminished expectation of privacy 
which surrounds the automobile," and because of the extensive and detailed regulation of 
automobiles and their operation. 433 U.S. at 12-13. People were held to have a "substantially 
greater" expectation of privacy in personal luggage than in an automobile. [d. at 13. 
42. /d. (footnote omitted). 
43. [d. at 15 (footnote omitted). In Chadwick, the Court reiterated (as the Court had in earlier 
decisions, see supra note 30) that warrantless searches of luggage or other personal property seized at 
the time of arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest if the search is remote either in time or 
place from the arrest. 433 U.S. at 15. 
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however, indicate that personal property over which the police have 
gained exclusive control might be subject to a warrantless search in 
appropriate circumstances. 44 The Court noted that a warrantless search 
might be justified "if officers have reason to believe that luggage con-
tains some immediately dangerous instrumentality such as explosives, 
because it would be foolhardy to transport it to the station house without 
opening the luggage and disarming the weapon. ,,45 
The Court rejected the argument that searches of possessions within 
an arrestee's immediate control should be permitted on the grounds that 
there is a reduced expectation of privacy caused by the arrest. The Court 
reasoned that' 'unlike searches of the person ... searches of possessions 
within an arrestee's immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced 
expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. Respondents' privacy 
interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply 
because they were under arrest. ,,46 
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the warrantless search 
of the footlocker was not a legitimate Chimel search incident to arrest. 
This followed from the findings that at the time of the warrantless search 
of the footlocker, it was in the exclusive control of law enforcement of-
ficers, the arrestees were securely in custody, the search was conducted 
more than an hour after police gained exclusive control, and there was no 
other exigency justifying the warrantless search. 47 
The Court's discussion of the particular facts of the case indicates 
that the determination of whether exclusive control exists is to be made 
on a case by case basis, based on a consideration of all relevant facts. 48 In 
New York v. Belton, 49 the Supreme Court noted that the mere fact that a 
container and its contents have been seized by a police officer does not 
44. [d. See Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (1978), analyzed infra note 50. 
45. 433 U.S. at 15 n.9. See infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
46. [d. at 16 n.lO. 
47. [d. at 15. Although not explicitly stated by the Court, the warrantless search of the 
footlocker also could have been held not to be a lawful search incident to arrest because it was not 
contemporaneous in time and place with the arrest, as required by Chimel. See supra note 30. 
The respondents did not challenge the warrantless seizure of the footlocker. 433 U.S. at II. If 
the warrantless seizure had been challenged, it probably would have been upheld on the grounds that 
the footlocker would have disappeared to an unknown location had it not been seized immediately. 
See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, §§ 6.5(b), (c). 
48. As discussed infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981), has held that Chadwick's exclusive control rule does not prohibit police from searching con-
tainers discovered in the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile searched without a 
warrant incident to the lawful arrest of the occupants of the automobile. See infra notes 59-149 and 
accompanying text. 
49. 453 U.S. at461-62n.5. 
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mean that the officer has exclusive control of the container and its con-
tents within the meaning of Chadwick. so 
As noted earlier, S I the Court in Chadwick indicated that personal 
property' 'immediately associated with the person of the arrestee" can be 
searched without a warrant even though the arresting officer has exclu-
sive control of such property. The opinion did not define the types of 
personal property that might be within this "immediately associated" 
standard, and did not explain why such types of personal property should 
be excepted from Chadwick's exclusive control rule. "The Court's 
opinion does not explain why a wallet carried in the arrested person's 
clothing, but not the footlocker in the present case, is subject to 'reduced 
expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.' ... Nor does the Court 
explain how such items as purses or briefcases fit into the dichotomy. 
50. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Belton, agreed that exclusive control of an article within 
the meaning of Chadwick does not occur simply because a police officer is holding the article in his 
hand. He stated that exclusive control means more; it requires that the officer have' 'sufficient con-
trol such that there is no significant risk that the arrestee or his confederates 'might gain possession 
ofa weapon or destructable evidence'." 454 U.S. at471 n.5 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
at 763). Justice Brennan also argued in Belton that "the issue of exclusive control presents a question 
offact to be decided under the circumstances of each case .... " 454 U.S. at471 n.5. See infra notes 
95-105 and accompanying text. 
Lower courts have agreed that exclusive control of an article is to be determined on a case by 
case basis, and that an arresting officer does not gain exclusive control of an article simply because 
he has taken the article into his hands. United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1981). In 
Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (1978), a warrantless search of an arrestee's 
pocketbook by the arresting officer was upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The search of 
the pocketbook occurred after the arrest and after the pocketbook was seized and in the hands of the 
arresting officer, who had responded to a report of a shooting at an apartment complex. When the 
officer arrived at the complex's parking lot, he observed a man and a woman struggling over a 
pocketbook. After the man told the officer that the woman had done the shooting and had a gun in 
her pocketbook, the officer grabbed the pocketbook, opened it, and seized a gun that was inside. At 
this time, he was only a few feet from the woman and, according to the court, was "still involved in 
an uncontrolled and potentially life endangering situation." 40 Md. App. at 653, 395 A.2d at 167. 
The court consequently held that the warrantless search of the pocketbook was permissible under 
Chimel as a search of the area within an arrestee's control, because at the time of the search the 
woman was neither handcuffed nor under any physical restraints, and, being only a few feet from 
the officer, was therefore within "the Chimel perimeter of reachability, lungeability, or grasp-
ability, i.e., the area from within which she could gain access to the pocketbook and the gun." [d. 
(Although the court did not discuss whether the woman had been arrested prior to the search of the 
pocketbook, the warrantless search of the pocketbook could permissibly precede the actual arrest. 
See supra notes 24, 30). In Dawson the court also noted that Chadwick did not prohibit the war-
rantless search of the pocketbook, because the pocketbook was "immediately associated with the 
person of the arrestee" at the time of the search, and was thus "analytically akin to a search of an 
item found in an arrestee's clothing or pockets," and, alternatively, because "the uncontrolled and 
potentially life endangering situation" constituted "exigent circumstances" within the meaning of 
Chadwick. 40 Md. App. at 653,395 A.2d at 167. See supra notes 4345 and accompanying text. 
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps the holding. . will be limited in the future to objects that are 
relatively immobile by virtue of their size or absence of a means of pro-
pulsion. "52 If the opening and inspection of the contents of a container 
or other item of personal property constitutes a fourth amendment 
search because it violates a person's actual and legitimate expectation of 
privacy, 5 3 if the police have exclusive control of the container and its con-
tents when they open and inspect the contents of the container, and if 
there are no exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment should pro-
hibit the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of the 
container, regardless of whether the container is immediately associated 
with the person. In Chadwick, the Court offers no reasoning relating its 
immediately associated with the person distinction to the fourth amend-
ment's reasonableness requirement. 54 
52. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 20-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As discussed 
earlier, see supra note 24, the Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and 
in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), appeared to permit police, without a warrant, to open 
and inspect any items found on the person of an arrestee being searched incident to a lawful arrest. 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461, stated in dictum that Robinson allows police to search con-
tainers located during the search of an arrestee's person even though the container searched could 
hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested. The 
Court in Bel/on, although citing with approval the holding in Robinson that the warrantless search 
of a crumpled-up cigarette package found on an arrestee's person was permissible as a search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, did not reach the question of whether Chadwick's "exclusive control" and 
"immediately associated with the person" standards had modified the permissible scope of the 
search of the person of an arrestee under Robinson. See supra note 24. 
One lower court has asserted that Chadwick only limits the search of items that are within 
an arrestee's immediate control, such as luggage, but does not prohibit the police from searching 
an arrestee's clothes, as occurred in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), or items found 
in an arrestee's pocket, as occurred in Robinson. United States v. Berry, 560 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 
1977). In Berry the Court held that an attache case carried by an arrestee at the time he was arrested 
was not immediately associated with the arrestee's person and was subject to Chadwick's exclusive 
control rule. 
Lower courts have held that a woman's pocketbook is immediately associated with an arrestee's 
person, Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 (1978), (see supra note 50), but that a brief-
case, Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App. 527, 387 A.2d 1134 (1978), attache case, United States v. 
Berry, 560 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977), suitcase, United States v. Ester, 442 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977), State v. Dudley, 561 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. App. 1978), and overnight case, State v. Dean, 574 
P.2d 572 (Kan. 1978), are not immediately associated with an arrestee's person. 
53. See supra note 6. 
54. The "immediately associated with the person" distinction is also inconsistent with the 
determination in Chadwick that there is no distinction under the fourth amendment's warrant clause 
between searches of one's person, home, office, private communications, and personal property. 
433 U.S. at 6-7. 
Without citing or analyzing Chadwick, the Supreme Court stated in dictum in United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. at 798, that "a container carried at the time of arrest often may be searched without a 
warrant and even without any specific suspicion concerning its contents." 
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The Chadwick Court also did not describe the types of containers 
and other items of personal property, other than personal luggage, that 
are not immediately associated with an arrestee's person, and thus sub-
ject to its exclusive control and exigent circumstances standards. The 
Court, however, subsequently addressed, in automobile exception search 
cases, H the issue of the application of Chadwick to the warrantless open-
ing and inspection of the contents of closed, opaque containers. 56 
The Chadwick decision thus limits the right of police to open 
without a warrant and inspect luggage and certain other types of con-
tainers and personal property discovered in the area within an arrestee's 
immediate control during a Chimel search incident to lawful arrest. 
Although Chimel may authorize a warrantless search of the area adjacent 
to a lawfully arrested individual, the right of the police to open and 
inspect the contents of luggage and certain other containers found within 
55. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See supra note 39 and infra notes 193-321 and accom-
panying text. 
56. As discussed subsequently, see infra notes 295-321 and accompanying text, the validity of a 
warrantless opening of a container and inspection of its contents by police should be determined by 
deciding first whether the police conduct constituted a search by violating an individual's actual and 
reasonable expectations of privacy, see supra note 6, and then, if the answer is affirmative, determ-
ining whether, under Chadwick, the police had exclusive control of the container and its contents; 
and finally, if the police had exclusive control, whether there were exigent circumstances. This 
approach should be followed regardless of whether the police attempt to justify a warrantless search 
of a container under the Chimel search incident to a lawful arrest exception or under the automobile 
exception, because the determination of whether warrantless police conduct is a fourth amendment 
search or seizure is separate and distinct from the determination of whether the warrantless police 
conduct was reasonable under the fourth amendment, see supra note 6, and because Chadwick indi-
cates that the standards governing a warrantless search of luggage or personal property should be 
separate and distinct from the standards governing when luggage or personal property can be seized 
without a warrant and when an automobile can be searched without a warrant under Chimel or the 
automobile exception. In Chadwick, the Court gave no indication that the standard governing war-
rantless searches of luggage and other containers is dependent upon the justification for the warrant-
less seizure of the luggage or other container; in fact, the validity of the warrantless seizure of the 
footlocker was not challenged in Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. The Court in Chadwick also indicated 
that it was establishing general principles governing the search of luggage and other personal prop-
erty, which did not depend upon the justification for the search of an automobile or other premises 
where the luggage or other personal property was discovered, by stating that "in our view, when no 
exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at 
the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police 
authority." 433 U.S. at 15. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), modified this holding, by 
adopting a rule permitting police to open without a warrant and inspect the contents of any 
container in an automobile when they have probable cause to believe that seizable items are 
located somewhere in the automobile but not in any particular container therein, and when the auto-
mobile is being lawfully searched under the automobile exception. See infra notes 250-321 and 
accompanying text. 
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this area is limited by Chadwick's exclusive control, exigent cir-
cumstances, and immediately associated with the person standards. 
The Chadwick decision did not, however, limit the right of police, 
under the plain view seizure doctrine, to seize items having a nexus with 
criminal activity that are observed or discovered in plain view and within 
the Chimel immediate control area. 57 In Chadwick, the Court held that 
the federal agents had no right to open the footlocker without a warrant; 
however, it seems reasonable to conclude that if the contents of the 
footlocker-marijuana-had been observed in plain view at the time of 
arrest, the marijuana would have been subject to seizure without a war-
57. A warrantless seizure of an item discovered or observed during a lawful search of an 
arrestee's area of immediate control under Chimel is permitted if the requirements of the plain view 
seizure doctrine are met. See Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 465 n.24 (1971) (plurality opinion). (Although three requirements of the plain view 
seizure doctrine were defined by only a plurality of the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, lower federal courts and state courts have almost universally followed the Coolidge inter-
pretation of that doctrine. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 4.11.) The first requirement is that the 
government agent making the seizure must have lawfully entered the premises where the seizure was 
made, whether pursuant to a warrant or under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66 (plurality opinion), Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1540-41, 1545, and, at the 
same time the agent must discover or observe the item seized while he is in a place he has a right to be. 
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,5-6 (1982). This would require, in a warrantless search under 
Chimel, that the police be lawfully on the premises where the arrest was made and that the item 
seized be discovered or observed while the officer is within the area of the arrestee's immediate con-
trol. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 465 n. 24. The second requirement is that it must be 
immediately apparent to an officer when he first observes or discovers the item seized that there is 
probable cause to believe that the item is evidence, contraband, or an instrumentality of crime, id. at 
466 (plurality opinion); Illinois v. Andreas, 51 U.S.L.W. 5157, 5159 (U.S. June 28,1983); Brown, 
103 S. Ct. at 1542 (plurality opinion), or is another object seizable under the fourth amendment, see 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), without any further testing or investigation of the item to 
determine if the item has a nexus with criminal activity. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 11.04. 
Finally, the discovery of the item must be inadvertent and not anticipated, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 
469. (That is, the government agents must not have probable cause to believe the item seized would 
be on the premises searched, sufficient to have obtained a search warrant authorizing seizure of the 
item. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 11.03.) The four dissenters in Coolidge, however, refused 
to accept the plurality's inadvertent discovery requirement under the plain view seizure doctrine, 403 
U.S. at 505 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting), 403 U.S. at 514 (White, J., concurring and dissen-
ting). See also Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44 (1983). The majority of lower federal and 
state courts, however, have accepted this requirement "as the law of the land." W. LA FAVE, supra 
note 6, § 4.11 (d). The warrantless seizure of contraband, stolen, or dangerous objects may be per-
missible under the plain view seizure doctrine even when the police know in advance that they will 
find the objects in plain view on the premises and intend to seize them. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471. In 
addition, when exigent circumstances were present, a seizure may be upheld under the plain view 
seizure doctrine even though the discovery of the items seized was not inadvertent. [d. at 471. 
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rant, whether or not the footlocker was within the area of the arrestee's 
immediate control. S8 
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE INCIDENT TO A 
LAWFUL ARREST: NEW YORK v. BELTON 
In New York v. Beiton, S9 the Supreme Court held for the first time 
that a warrantless search of an automobile could be permissible as a 
search incident to a lawful arrest under Chimel v. California. In Belton, a 
state policeman stopped a speeding automobile and requested the 
driver's license and the automobile's registration. 60 The policeman 
discovered that none of the four men in the automobile owned it or was 
related to its owner. While making these determinations, the officer 
smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the floor of the automobile an 
envelope marked "Supergold," a term the officer associated with mari-
juana. He then ordered the occupants out of the automobile and placed 
all of them under arrest for unlawful possession of marijuana. After 
patting down each of the occupants, the arresting officer stood each 
occupant next to the sides of the automobile61 in positions such that 
mutual physical contact was impossible. The officer then seized the 
"Supergold" envelope, in which he found marijuana. He also searched 
the passenger compartment ofthe automobile and found ajacket belong-
ing to Belton on the back seat. In a zipped pocket of the jacket, the officer 
found a quantity of cocaine. Belton's motion to suppress the cocaine as 
evidence was denied by the trial court, and he was convicted of a con-
trolled substance offense involving possession of the cocaine. 
The Court in Belton held that the warrantless search of Belton's 
jacket was lawful62 and that it did not violate the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution. 63 Although the passenger compart-
ment of the automobile might have been held to be within the immediate 
58. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n. 13 (1979), discussed infra notes 195-212 and 
accompanying text, the Court indicates that Chadwick does not require a warrant when the contents 
of a container are open to plain view. 
59. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
60. The warrantless stop of the automobile and the request by the state policeman to see the 
operator's license and the automobile's registration were not challenged in Belton; however, these 
warrantless actions would have been upheld. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
61. See 453 U.S. at 456. 
62. Belton did not challenge the lawfulness of his arrest. 453 U.S. at 460 n.2. 
63. Because of this holding, the Court did not address the question of whether the search of 
Belton's jacket and the seizure of the cocaine in the jacket were permissible under the automobile 
exception. 453 U.S. at 462 n. 6. 
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control of the four arrestees at the time the arresting officer searched 
Belton's jacket, 64 Justice Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority, 65 adopted a 
per se rule that now defines the permissible scope of the search of an 
automobile and its contents when the occupants of an automobile have 
been lawfully arrested. 
The Court determined in Belton that whenever a police officer has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may, 
64. At the time of the search of the back seat of the passenger compartment of the automobile, 
the occupants of the automobile were apparently standing by the side of the automobile, see 453 
u.s. at 456, so that the rear passenger seat of the automobile arguably was within the lunge or grasp 
of one or more of the arrested occupants at the time of the search of Belton's jacket. This argument 
would be stronger if the facts in Belton had indicated that a passenger door (especially a rear 
passenger door) of the automobile hr.d been open at the time of the search of Belton's jacket or if the 
window of a passenger door (especially a rear passenger door) had been rolled down at the time of 
the search of the jacket. If any such facts had been present in Belton, it would have been easier for 
one of the four arrestees (or Belton) to have lunged or reached into the rear passenger compartment 
of the automobile and to have hidden, scattered or removed the cocaine in the jacket. Two other 
facts support an argument that the automobile's rear passenger compartment was within the imme-
diate control of Belton or one of the other three arrestees at the time of the search of the jacket. The 
first is that none of the four arrestees apparently were handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained 
at the time of the search of the jacket (see supra note 34 and accompanying text). The second is that 
there were four arrestees and only one arresting officer (see supra note 33 and accompanying text). 
Although the majority in Belton declined to decide the case simply by applying the Chimel prin-
ciples, see supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text, Justice Stewart stated for the majority in 
Belton that "our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively 
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not 
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or eviden-
tiary item.' Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763." 453 U.S. at 460. 
Justice Brennan, however, argued in dissent that under the specific facts of the case, Belton's 
jacket was not within the area of immediate control of the four arrestees and therefore could not be 
searched without a warrant under Chimel. 453 U.S. at 466-67. Although Justice Brennan did not 
provide reasoning to support this conclusion, it might have been argued that when the officer seized 
the cocaine Belton's jacket had already been picked up and was within the officer's exclusive control 
within the meaning of Chadwick, and, for that reason, the zipped pocket could not have been 
searched without a warrant. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. For this argument to suc-
ceed, however, the jacket would have to be found not to be an item immediately associated with the 
person, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text, and to be the type of personal property to 
which Chadwick's exclusive control rule applies. See supra notes 55-56 and infra notes 284-94 and 
accompanying text. Furthermore, there would also have to be a finding that there was no exigency at 
the time Belton's jacket was searched in order for Chadwick's exclusive control rule to be applicable. 
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Dawson v. State, 40 Md. App. 640, 395 A.2d 160 
(1978), discussed supra note 50. 
65. Justice Rehnquist concurred in Justice Stewart's opinion, providing the fifth vote that 
made Justice Stewart's opinion the opinion of the Court. Justice Rehnquist stated, however, that he 
would like to have based the judgment of the Court upon an overruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) (which made the exclusionary rule, see supra note 6, applicable to the states), but no other 
Justice expressed agreement with that view. Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's judgment, but 
on grounds different from those stated in Justice Stewart's opinion. Justice Stevens' rationale is 
expressed in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 444 (1981). Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and White dissented. 
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without a search warrant, conduct a Chime! search of the interior of the 
passenger compartment of the automobile (but not the trunk) and 
examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger com-
partment. The Court defined "container" as any "object capable of 
holding another object," and included in the definition "closed or open 
glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere 
within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, 
clothing, and the like. "66 The containers found to be subject to search 
under Belton may be closed or open. 67 Justice Stewart, however, did not 
differentiate between locked and unlocked containers68 or between 
opaque and transparent containers. 69 Furthermore, it appears that a 
container does not have to be one that could contain a weapon or 
evidence in order to be subject to a warrantless search; 70 one such con-
tainer, a crumpled-up cigarette package,71 was searched in United 
States v. Robinson. 72 
Although the Court adopted a per se rule defining the permissible 
scope of the search of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest under 
Chime!, Justice Stewart stated in Belton that this rule in "no way alters 
the fundamental principles established in the Chime! case regarding the 
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests. "73 This state-
ment implicitly permits, as does Chime!, a search of the passenger com-
partment of an automobile and any containers therein after its occupants 
are lawfully arrested, regardless of how trivial or minor the offense,74 
regardless of the fact that the offense for which the automobile's occu-
pants were arrested is not an offense for which evidence could exist, 7 sand 
66. 453 U.S. at 460 n. 4. See Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981)("container" 
within the meaning of Belton includes a brown paper grocery bag). 
67. 453 U.S. at 461. 
68. Justice Brennan stated in dissent that "presumably" the majority would have reached the 
same result even if the four arrestees had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car and if the 
search "had extended to locked luggage or other inaccessible containers locked in the back seat of 
the car." [d. at 468. 
69. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. 
70. 453 U.S. at 461. 
71. [d. 
72. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Robinson is analyzed supra note 24. 
73. 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3. Justice Stewart also stated that "our holding today does no more than 
determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context." [d. 
Michigan v. Long, 51 U.S.L.W. 5231, 5232 n. I (U.S. June 28,1983), raised but did not decide the 
question of whether a search of an automobile can be made under Belton when the police have prob-
able cause to arrest an occupant but do not actually effect the arrest. 
74. See supra note 28. 
75. Cj. supra note 24. 
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regardless ofthe lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that there 
are weapons or evidence in the automobile's passenger compartment. 76 
Belton's per se rule departs from prior decisions interpreting the per-
missible scope of a search of the area within the immediate control of an 
arrestee. Previously the Court held that even though the police could 
search the area within the immediate control of an arrestee in every case 
where the arrest was lawful, 77 the scope of that area was to be determined 
on a case by case basis, taking into account all relevant factors.78 Justice 
Stewart noted in Belton 79 that the per se rule being adopted was 
analogous to the one previously adopted in United States v. Robinson, 80 
that allowed a full-scale search of an arrestee's person on all occasions 
when that individual has been lawfully placed under custodial arrest. 81 
He stated that one reason for adopting this rule was the difficulties 
encountered by the courts in defining on a case by case basis, following 
Chime/, the permissible scope of a warrantless search of the interior of 
an automobile's passenger compartment incident to the lawful arrest 
of its occupants. 82 An additional reason was the desirability of noti-
fying the public of how courts will define their constitutional protection 
in applying "a settled principle to a recurring factual situation" and of 
notifying police of the scope of their authority in "the recurring factual 
situation" of searches of automobiles after their occupants have been 
lawfully arrested. 83 
In United States v. Robinson,84 however, the Court adduced dif-
ferent reasons. These included the need to protect an arresting officer 
from possible danger if an arrested individual possesses a dangerous 
weapon,8' and the fact that the decision by an arresting officer to search 
the person of an arrestee is "necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment" that 
should not be subject to later judicial review. 86 In Belton, the Court did 
76. See supra note 28. In order for the police to make a warrantless search of an automobile 
under the automobile exception, however, the police must have probable cause to believe that the 
automobile contains seizable items such as weapons, contraband, or evidence of crime, see infra 
note 151 and accompanying text, although arrest of the occupants of an automobile is not a pre-
requisite for a warrantless search of the automobile under the automobile exception. See infra note 
177 and accompanying text. 
77. See supra note 28. 
78. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
79. 453 U.S. at 459. 
80. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
81. See supra note 24. 
82. 453 U.S. at 459, 460. 
83. [d. at 460. 
84. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
85. [d. at 234-35. 
86. [d. at 235. 
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not refer to this argument in justifying its adoption of aper se rule and, in 
Robinson, the Court did not support its per se rule by referring to the 
arguments stated in Belton. Because the rule adopted in both Robinson 
and Chimel have the purpose of preventing lawfully arrested individuals 
from destroying or concealing evidence or from obtaining a weapon, it 
would seem that the reasons supporting the Belton rule should be the 
same as those provided in Robinson. 
Justice Stewart in Belton also justified the warrantless search of con-
tainers found within an automobile's passenger compartment on the 
grounds that if the passenger compartment is within the reach of an 
arrested occupant of the automobile, other containers inside the 
passenger compartment will also be within his reach. 87 He concluded that 
the "justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy 
interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the 
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. "88 
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that an exception to the general 
requirement for a warrant should be based upon a careful consideration 
"of the facts and circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on 
the reasons supporting the exception rather than on any bright line rule of 
general application. ,,89 He also argued that Chimel requires a case by 
case delineation of the area within an arrestee's immediate control. The 
court should determine not "whether the arrestee could ever have 
reached the area that was searched but whether he could have reached it 
at the time of arrest and search."90 Justice Brennan argued that the 
court's per se rule was inconsistent with the rationale underlying Chimel 
because it "grants police officers authority to conduct a warrantless 
87. 453 U.S. at 460. 
88. [d. at 461. Justice Stewart in Be/ton drew an analogy to Chime/'s holding, 395 U.S. at 763, 
noting that police can search drawers within an arrestee's reach, but not all drawers in the arrestee's 
house. 453 U.S. at 461. The opinion in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), did not differentiate between the search of the person and the 
search of containers found on the person in defining the permissible scope of a search on one's per-
son incident to arrest. See supra note 24. 
89. 453 U.S. at 464. Justice Brennan also approvingly quoted, id. at 464 n. 1, the following 
statements made in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931): "There is no 
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and cir-
cumstances." Justice Brennan also referred, 453 U.S. at 469 n. 4, to the following statement in 
Chime/: "[The Court) cannot ... excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those 
who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that 
course imperative." 395 U.S. at 761 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948». 
90. 453 U.S. at 469. Justice Brennan also cited, 453 U.S. at 468, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 
291,295 (1973), for the proposition "that the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate 
with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement." 
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'area' search under circumstances where there is no chance that the 
arrestee 'might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' , '91 
Even if the Court in Belton was correct in adopting a per se rule 
defining the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile 
under Chimef9 2 rather than requiring the permissible scope of searches to 
be decided on a case by case basis, the majority opinion in Belton, as 
noted by Justice Brennan in dissent,93 is difficult to reconcile with United 
States v. Chadwick. 94 In addition, the rule will be difficult to apply to the 
varying factual situations confronting police when they arrest an occu-
pant of an automobile. 
The Court in Belton held that the seizure of the cocaine in Belton's 
jacket was not prohibited by Chadwick, because that case did not involve 
"an arguably valid search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. ,,95 The 
Court distinguished Chadwick, wherein the Court noted that the 
challenged search of a footlocker had occurred "more than an hour after 
federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long 
after respondents were securely in custody. "96 Thus, that search could 
"not be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other 
exigency. "97 Moreover, the Court argued, the police did not gain exclu-
sive control of Belton's jacket and the cocaine in a jacket pocket within 
the meaning of Chadwick simply because a police officer searched 
Belton's jacket and seized its contents. 98 Justice Stewart, however, did 
not explain why Belton's jacket and the cocaine in a jacket pocket were 
not within the exclusive control of the arresting officer within the mean-
ing of Chadwick once the officer had taken possession of it;99 did 
91. 453 U.S. at 468 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763). 
Prior to the Belton decision, Professor Wayne La Fave argued that the relevant facts in determ-
ining what areas of an automobile can be searched without a warrant under Chimel should be those 
"which show (i) what places it would be possible for the arrestee presently to reach, and (ii) perhaps 
of somewhat lesser importance, how probable it is that the arrestee would undertake to seek means 
of resistance or escape or to destroy evidence." W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.1 at p. 502. 
92. This article will not analyze in depth the pros and cons of per se exceptions to the general 
rule requiring a warrant for search and seizures. See generally, La Fave, "Case-by-Case Adjudica-
tion" versus "Standardized Procedures"; The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127. 
93. 453 U.S. at 469. 
94. 433 U.S. I (1977). See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text. 
95. 453 U.S. at 462. 
96. [d. 
97. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at IS (quoted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 462). 
Justice Stewart also quoted, id., a statement in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764n. II (1979), 
discussed infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text, where the Court had stated that the war-
rantless search of a suitcase was not argued to have been a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest. 
98. 453 U.S. at 461 n. 5. 
99. Cj. supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
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not explain why containers found within the interior of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile after its occupants have been arrested are 
always subject to a warrantless search; and did not explain why 
containers are never within the exclusive control of the arresting officer 
within the meaning of Chadwick100 and why a per se exception to 
Chadwick's exclusive control rule is necessary in Belton situations. 
He gave no reasons for adopting this exception to Chadwick's exclusive 
control standard. 
Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Stewart that a police officer 
does not gain exclusive control of an item within the meaning of Chad-
wick "simply by holding it in his hand,"lol and stated in his dissent that 
"exclusive control" under Chadwick "means more than that. It means 
sufficient control such that there is no significant risk that the arrestee or 
his confederates 'might gain possession of a weapon or destructible 
evidence.' ... The issue of exclusive control presents a question of fact 
to be decided under the circumstances of each case .... " 1 02 
Justice Brennan is correct in interpreting Chadwick as requiring a 
case by case determination of whether an item is in the exclusive control 
of a police officer. 103 Justice Stewart in Belton supported his analysis of 
Chadwick by quoting a passage from Chadwick that discusses exclusive 
control within the context of Chadwick's particular facts. 104 Applying 
this argument to the facts of Belton, Justice Stewart implicitly, without 
any supporting analysis, created a per se exception to Chadwick's exclu-
sive control standard with respect to containers 1 O~ discovered when police 
search the interior of an automobile's passenger compartment after 
lawfully arresting its occupants. Justice Stewart found this new rule to be 
consistent with Chadwick. In so doing, he failed to distinguish between 
two issues. The first involves the identification of areas adjacent to an 
arrestee that may be searched without a warrant (an issue governed by 
Chime/'s immediate control standard). The second involves the criteria 
to be used to determine when a container or other item of personal prop-
erty found within a searchable area, i.e., that area adjacent to and within 
100. Cj. supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
101. 453 U.S. at 471 n. 5. 
102. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763). 
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
104. This passage from Chadwick. quoted in Belton at 453 U.S. at 462, reads as follows: "Here 
the search was conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the 
footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be 
viewed as incidental to the arrest or justified by any other exigency." United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. at 15. 
105. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. 
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the immediate control of an arrestee, is within an officer's exclusive con-
trol within the meaning of Chadwick. 
In justifying its per se rule, the majority in Belton referred to the 
difficulty courts had encountered in determining when passenger com-
partments of automobiles were within an arrestee's immediate control 
within the meaning of Chimel, 106 but did not suggest that the courts had 
encountered any difficulty defining when police can search and inspect 
the contents of containers found within the passenger compartment of 
the automobile. This exception to Chadwick's "exclusive control" stan-
dard, however, is consistent with the other reason given by the Belton 
majority for adopting its per se rule: giving notice to the public of 
the scope of their constitutional rights and to the police of the scope of 
their authority. 107 
Justice Powell, who joined Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court 
in Belton, noted in his concurring opinion in Robbins v. California that 
the Belton rule is justified by the fact that "immediately preceding the 
arrest, the passengers have complete control over the entire interior of the 
automobile, and can place weapons or contraband into pockets or other 
containers as the officer approaches. Thus, practically speaking, it is dif-
ficult to justify varying degrees of protection for the general interior of 
the car and for the various containers found within. These considerations 
do not apply to the trunk of the car, which is not within the control of the 
passengers either immediately before or during the process of arrest. ,'108 
Justice Powell, however, did not discuss how this reasoning could be 
reconciled with the Court's determination in Chadwick that police can-
not open and inspect the contents of a piece of luggage within their exclu-
sive control even when they have probable cause to believe that the piece 
of luggage contains seizable items. 109 
The majority in Belton failed to explain why they would authorize 
police to search without a warrant all containers found within the 
passenger compartment of an automobile when that search is incident to 
the lawful arrest of its occupants, rather than requiring them to lock the 
articles in the trunk of the automobile or in the officer's police car and 
then to obtain a warrant to search containers. Such a procedure would 
promote the goals of preventing arrestees from obtaining weapons or 
concealing, removing, or destroying evidence, the goals underlying the 
106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
108. 453 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., concurring). 
109. See id. at 429-36 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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Chimel immediate control rule I 10 as well as the rule actually adopted by 
the Belton majority. This is so because the opportunity provided to an 
arrestee to lunge or grasp for a weapon or evidence in an automobile is 
not significantly different when the arresting officer takes time to lock 
containers in the trunk of an automobile than when that officer opens 
and inspects the contents of the containers. An arresting officer con-
cerned that the arrested occupants might lunge or grasp for weapons or 
evidence in the automobile while he was locking containers in its trunk 
could be authorized to seize the automobile's keys and to lock the doors 
and trunk, without removing any containers from the automobile. He 
might then lock the arrested occupants inside his police vehicle or have 
the automobile towed from the scene of the arrest to a police impound-
ment or storage lot. III Such alternative rules would be consistent with 
another of the reasons given by the majority in Belton for adopting its per 
se rule, 112 because they would define the rights of members of the public 
and the scope of the authority of the police just as clearly as does the 
Belton rule. 113 
Justice Stevens criticized Belton in his dissent in Robbins v. Cali-
fornia. 114 He argued that Belton would encourage police to arrest the 
operator of the automobile, and take him into custody even when they 
have the discretion simply to issue a summons or citation, II S only for the 
110. See also supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text. 
If Chadwick's exclusive control standard is to be applied on a case by case basis to searches of 
containers discovered within the passenger compartment of an automobile searched incident to the 
lawful arrest of the automobile's occupants, courts first should determine whether particular con-
tainers and other items of personal property are the types of personal property to which Chadwick's 
exclusive control rule is applicable. See supra notes 51-56 and infra notes 291-321 and accompanying 
text. Although some types of containers, such as suitcases and briefcases, to which Belton's per se 
rule applies should be subject to Chadwick's exclusive control rule, other types of containers subject 
to Belton's per se rule, such as paper bags and plastic trash bags, in certain cases should not be sub-
ject to Chadwick's exclusive control rule. See supra notes 51-56 and infra notes 291-321 and accom-
panying text. 
Ill. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
112. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7 .1(b) at 505-06. If police followed these alternatives, 
there would be the danger that un apprehended accomplices or members of the public might break 
into the automobile and remove evidence from the automobile or take the automobile (and any 
evidence therein); however, the automobile exception, see infra notes 150-61 and accompanying 
text, but not the Chimel doctrine, see supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text, is intended to permit 
police to act without a warrant to guard against such possibilities. 
113. See 453 U.S. at 460. See also supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
114. 453 U.S. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115. Some states give police officers discretion as to whether to arrest an operator of an 
automobile for a traffic offense or to allow the person to remain free from custody after giving him a 
summons or citation. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321.482, 485 (West 1981-82): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
8-2105 (1975); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 26-201-205 (1977). 
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purpose of searching the entire interior of the passenger compartment 
and the containers therein pursuant to Belton's per se rule .. Justice 
Stevens suggested that a police officer with such discretion might act in 
this manner "whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase or 
package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation." 116 
Some state courts and lower federal courts would hold a warrantless 
search incident to an arrest to be unlawful when the arresting officer is 
shown to have arrested the defendant solely for the purpose of conduct-
ing awarrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. These courts would 
say that such a purpose made the search unreasonable and invalid under 
the fourth amendment. 117 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
addressed this issue, in Scott v. United States, 118 the Court stated in 
dictum that fourth amendment violations are to be determined' 'under a 
standard of reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or 
motivation of the officers involved." 119 
As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Belton, 120 
its per se rule will be difficult to apply to the myriad of factual situations 
in which police lawfully arrest a person while he is driving or riding in an 
automobile; furthermore, Belton "offers no guidance to the police 
officer seeking to work out these answers for himself.,,121 
The majority in Belton stated that their decision' 'does no more than 
determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and prob-
lematic context" and that "it in no way alters the fundamental principles 
established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches inci-
116. 453 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also noted that 
persons apprehended for traffic violations are frequently not required to accompany the 
arresting officer to the police station before they are permitted to leave on their own 
recognizance or by using their dtiver's licenses as a form of bond. It is also possible that 
state law or local regulations may in some cases forbid police officers from taking persons 
into custody for violation of minor traffic laws. As a matter of constitutional law, 
however, any person lawfully arrested for the pettiest misdemeanor may be temporarily 
placed in custody. 
[d. at 450 (footnote omitted). As noted also by Justice Stevens in dissent in Robbins, an automobile 
driver's protection against warrantless searches of his automobile under Belton may depend upon 
whether state or local law authorizes police to arrest a person for a minor traffic violation. See supra 
note 115. 
117. E.g., Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 'F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavor v. 
United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); Blazak v. Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40 (D. Ariz. 1971); Diggs 
v. State, 345 So.2d 815 (Fla. App. 1977); State v. Cotterman, 544 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. App. 1976). Cj. 
People v. Watkins, 19 m.2d II, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960). See generally, W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, §§ 
5.2(e),7.5. 
118. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
119. [d. at 138 (footnote omitted). 
120. 453 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
121. [d. at 470 (Brennan, J.,dissenting). 
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dent to lawful custodial arrests." 1 H Justice Brennan disagreed. He noted 
in dissent that, although the majority "concludes that a warrantless 
search of a car may take place even though the suspect was arrested out-
side the car, it does not indicate how long after the suspect's arrest that 
search may validly be conducted. Would a warrantless search incident to 
arrest be valid if conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car? 
Thirty minutes? Three hours?"123 
In Belton, the majority stated that the search of an automobile's 
passenger compartment must be a "contemporaneous incident of that 
arrest, "124 but they did not address the issue raised by Justice Brennan 
because the arresting officer searched the automobile's passenger com-
partment immediately after placing the occupants under arrest. 12S The 
Court had indicated in Chadwick 1 26 that a search of a container that took 
place an hour after arrest was not a contemporaneous search and could 
not be upheld under Chimel. The decision in Belton, however, does not 
indicate how long a delay, short of an hour, is permissible between arrest 
of an automobile's occupants and the search of an automobile's 
passenger compartment. The permissible length of delay may depend 
upon the reasons for it. 127 A long delay might be permitted, for example, 
when the arresting officer must custodially arrest, physically restrain, 
and search the person of a number of individuals, or when the officer 
must wait for police dispatchers to determine whether an automobile is 
stolen or whether any of the arrestees had criminal records or were 
wanted as fugitives. 
Although the majority in Belton said that its per se rule does not alter 
the fundamental principles of Chimel v. California,128 it did not say 
whether the applicability of its per se rule is dependent upon the physical 
proximity to the automobile of an arrested occupant of the automobile at 
the time of the search of the automobile's passenger compartment. 129 
122. 453 u.s. at 460 n. 3. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
123. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 
(1974), discussed supra note 24. 
124. 453 U.S. at 460. 
125. [d. at 456. The Court noted that the search of Belton's jacket "followed immediately 
upon that arrest." [d. at 462. 
126. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Monclavo:Cruz, 662 
F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981) (warrantless search of purse at police station more than an hour after 
police had seized it from an automobile and when police had exclusive control of it not permissible 
under Belton and Chadwick). 
127. Cf Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981 )(permissible length of investigative stop of 
suspect for Questioning depends upon nature of crime being investigated and types of Questions that 
are necessary in a particular situation to make a reasonable investigation) (dictum). 
128. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
129. Justice Brennan raised this issue in his dissent in Belton. 453 U.S. at 470. 
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The opmlOn also failed to indicate whether the per se rule applies 
regardless of the amount of physical restraint to which the arrested occu-
pants are subjected when the automobile's passenger compartment is 
searched. Justice Stewart did not address these two issues in Belton, 
apparently because none of the arrested occupants of the automobile was 
handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained when police searched the 
passenger compartment. Furthermore, all of the arrestees were standing 
next to the automobile. 130 The majority in Belton did make it clear, by 
distinguishing Chadwick l31 from Belton on the grounds that in Chad-
wick the search took place after the arrestees were securely in custody, 132 
that a warrantless search of an automobile would not be permitted if the 
arrestees had been jailed. But Belton did not address whether a warrant-
less search of the passenger compartment of an automobile is permitted 
when the arrested occupant of the automobile has been handcuffed and 
locked in the back seat of a police car (which has a metal screen between 
the front and back seats) or handcuffed to a police officer. 133 In such 
situations, the passenger compartment of an automobile would not seem 
to be within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control of an arrested occu-
pant and therefore should not, under Chimel, be subject to a search 
without a warrant. Nevertheless, Belton's per se rule does seem to 
authorize a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile in such situations. 134 
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Belton also raised the ques-
tion of whether Belton's per se rule applies only to automobiles. 13~ The 
majority in Belton did not indicate whether their rule applies as well to 
vans, recreational vehicles, pickup trucks, trucks, and buses. 136 
130. See 453 U.S. at 456, 467. 
131. 433 U.S. I (1977). 
132. 453 U.S. at 462. The majority in Belton did not cite or discuss Preston v. United States, 
376 U.S. 364 (1964) or Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), cases in which the 
Court stated that a warrantless search of an automobile cannot be upheld under Chimel as a search 
incident to a lawful arrest when the automobile is not searched until after its occupants have been 
taken from the automobile to jailor to a courthouse. See supra note 30. 
133. Justice Brennan stated in dissent that "the result would presumably be the same even if 
[the arresting officer) had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing 
them under arrest. ... " 453 U.S. at 468. See State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 235 n.15, 440 A.2d 1311, 
1323 n. 15 (1981). 
134. Additional problems in applying Belton's per se rule may be presented when police grant 
an arrestee permission to secure the automobile and its contents before being taken to jail, or to drive 
his automobile to the police station or other government office where bail will be posted. See W. LA 
FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.I(c). 
135. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
136. The court in United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), noted "the physical 
differences between typical passenger automobiles and motor homes," id. at 1332 n. 7, but con-
cluded that Belton authorized the warrantless search of the interior passenger areas of a motor home 
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Even if this problem is resolved by limiting the rule to automobiles 
(which is the way Justice Stewart stated it I3 '), it will often be difficult to 
distinguish the' 'interior" of an automobile's' 'passenger compartment" 
(which is subject to a warrantless search under Belton's per se rule) from 
the automobile's "trunk" (which cannot be searched under Belton 
without a warrant). The majority in Belton stated that closed containers, 
including closed glove compartments, can be searched without a 
warrant, 138 but as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the majority did not 
indicate whether that ruling applied to a locked glove compartment, the 
interior of door panels, or the area under an automobile's 
floorboards. 139 An even more troublesome problem noted by Justice 
Brennan l40 is that the Court does not define the passenger compartment 
of a station wagon, hatchback, or taxicab with a glass panel separating 
the driver's compartment from the rest of the taxi's interior. 141 Similar 
problems will arise in defining the "interior of the passenger compart-
ment" of a van, recreational vehicle, and bus (if such vehicles are 
because the search was "directly related to the same fundamental justifications which dictate the 
results in ... Belton-i.e., the preservation of evidence and the discovery of weapons that the 
arrestee may use to escape or harm the arresting officer." Id. at 1332. 
Justice Brennan also asked in his Belton dissent whether the majority's per se rule permits police 
to enter and search a house without a warrant upon arresting a suspect they saw walking out of the 
house after they had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed in the house as a result of 
peering into the house from the outside. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court, 
however, in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), held that Chimel does not permit a house to be 
searched without a warrant when a person is arrested outside the house. The Court in Vale stated 
that "if a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside 
the house, ... not somewhere outside-whether two blocks away, ... twenty feet away, ... or on 
the sidewalk near the front." 399 U.S. at 33-34 (citations omitted). The majority in Belton did not 
cite or discuss Vale. 
137. See 453 U.S. at 460. 
138. Id. at 460 n. 4. 
139. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Belton also did not indicate, as noted 
earlier, whether other types of locked "containers" can be opened without a warrant. See supra 
notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
140. 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
141. United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982), held that a hatchback 
automobile's luggage storage area, which is accessible from inside the automobile, is the "interior of 
the passenger compartment" of such an automobile within the meaning of Belton's per se rule. Con-
ceivably under the Russell rationale the entire interior of a station wagon, likewise accessible from 
the inside of the vehicle, is the "interior of the passenger compartment" within the meaning of the 
Belton rule. Professor Yale Kamisar agrees with Professor Wayne La Fave, see W. LA FAVE, supra 
note 6, § 7.1 (1982 Supp.), that under Belton "the 'interior' or 'passenger compartment' of a vehicle 
included all space 'reachable' without exiting the vehicle." KAMISAR, 4th Amendment Hatchback, 
Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1981, at A29, col. 3. Under this theory, some areas of the bed ofa pickup 
truck that can be reached from the cab through a sliding window or panel might be defined as the 
"passenger compartment" of the pickup, and subject to a warrantless search under Belton assuming 
that a pickup truck is an "automobile" within the meaning of Belton. 
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"automobiles" in the Belton sense). If the Court's goals are to provide 
clear-cut guidelines delimiting the authority of the police, to protect the 
police and the public from arrestees using weapons carried in an 
automobile, and to prevent arrestees from concealing, destroying, or 
removing evidence that may be in an automobile, it follows that the entire 
interiors of station wagons, hatchbacks, and vans, and both the cabs and 
the cargo areas of pickup trucks and trucks, should be subject to warrant-
less searches under Chimel and Belton. If the Court's goal is to infringe 
upon rights of privacy only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect 
the police and the public, and to prevent the destruction, concealment, or 
removal of evidence that may be in an automobile, it seems inescapable 
that the determination of whether a particular area of a station wagon, 
van, hatchback, truck, pickup truck, or recreational vehicle is within an 
arrestee's lunge, grasp, or immediate control should be based upon a case 
by case weighing of all relevant facts. 142 
An additional problem in applying the Belton rule will occur when 
not all of the occupants of an automobile are arrested. 143 If police stop 
for a traffic violation an automobile with more than one occupant and 
arrest only the driver, locking him in the sealed-off rear passenger 
compartment of a police car, a search of the automobile's passenger com-
partment is difficult to justify under Chime/'s immediate control stan-
dard. 144 In such a situation, the automobile's passenger compartment 
would not seem to be within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control of the 
arrested driver of the automobile. The fact that the automobile's 
passenger compartment is within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control 
of those passengers not arrested would not justify a warrantless search of 
the passenger compartment under Chime/, because Chime/ does not 
authorize the warrantless search of an area within the immediate control 
142. See supra notes 31-35, 89-91 and accompanying text. 
Justice Powell, however, who joined Justice Stewart's opinion in Belton as one of the five 
members of the majority, stated in his concurring opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 
431 n. 2 (1981), that a recessed luggage compartment at the rear of a station wagon was a "trunk" 
and not a "passenger compartment" within the meaning of Belton's per se rule. 
The Court in Belton, by referring to the "interior of the passenger compartment" in its opin-
ion, also appears not to include a portable luggage container or rack affixed to the top of an 
automobile within the scope of its per se rule, c/. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 771 (1979) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), although such a rack may be subject to a warrantless search under a case 
by case application of Chimel. 
143. Belton only refers to making a warrantless search of an automobile's passenger compart-
ment when "the occupant" has been lawfully arrested. 453 U.S. at 460. 
144. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. 
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of a person who has not been lawfully arrested. 14s Another problem in 
applying Belton when not all of the occupants of an automobile are 
arrested may occur when the arresting officer searching the automobile's 
passenger compartment discovers a container that is owned or claimed by 
one of the non-arrested occupants. 146 The police should be able to 
145. 395 U.S. at 755. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 6, § 6.02. But if police conducting a 
lawful investigation of an automobile that has been stopped for a traffic violation or that has been 
involved in an accident have a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences from those facts, that a non-arrested suspect is potentially dangerous and may gain imme-
diate control of a weapon, they may, without a warrant, search areas of the automobile's passenger 
compartment and containers therein in which a weapon could be placed or hidden. Michigan v. 
Long, 51 U.S.L.W. 5231 (U.S. June 28,1983). The holding in Long is based upon the reasoning in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (which authorizes police to make a protective search for weapons 
(frisk) of a suspect's person when they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and 
dangerous to the police or others), Chime/, and Belton. In order to search an automobile without a 
warrant under Long, police are not required to have a reasonable belief that a non-arrested suspect is 
both armed and dangerous (which is required in order to frisk the person of the suspect under Terry 
v. Ohio). The warrantless searches authorized by Long are for the purposes of protecting police (and 
other persons near the automobile) in case a non-arrested suspect re-enters the automobile during 
the police investigation after breaking away from police control or re-enters the automobile after the 
police conclude their investigation, and gains access to a weapon that he might use to injure the 
police or others nearby. 51 U.S.L.W. at 5236-37. In Long, the Supreme Court determined that the 
police had a reasonable belief that the suspect in question was dangerous because the investigation 
occurred near midnight in a rural area, the police had observed a large knife in the interior of the 
automobile as the suspect was about to re-enter the automobile, and the suspect appeared to be 
under the influence of an intoxicant and had driven his automobile into a ditch while driving errati-
cally at an excessive speed. Id. at 5236. The Court in Long stated that this finding was not affected by 
the fact the suspect lawfully possessed the knife that the police observed in the automobile, id. at 
5237 n. 16, but the Supreme Court did not otherwise define when police would have a reasonable 
belief that a non-arrested occupant of an automobile is dangerous. The majority in Long rejected 
Justice Brennan's argument in dissent that police in such cases should pursue "less intrusive, but 
equally effective, means of insuring their safety," 51 U.S.L.W. at 5240 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 
(such as detaining the suspect outside the automobile, asking him where the automobile'S registra-
tion is, and retrieving the registration themselves, id. at 5240 n. 7), on the grounds that police offi-
cers, "faced with having to make quick determinations about self-protection and the defense of 
innocent citizens in the area," should not have to "also decide instantaneously what 'less intrusive' 
alternative exists to ensure that any threat presented by the suspect will be neutralized." 51 
U.S.L. W. at 5237 n. 16. But the searches authorized under Long are solely for the purpose of finding 
weapons; such searches are not for the purpose of finding evidence. [d. at 5236 n. 14. 
146. If the officer opens such a container and discovers an item in the container that incrimin-
ates only another occupant, that incriminated occupant probably would not have standing to 
challenge the admissibility of the item unless he established a right of joint possession or use in the 
item. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), 
discussed supra note 6; and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Whether an occupant of an 
automobile would have standing to challenge the search and seizure of a container and its contents 
when he does not own or have a present possessory interest or right of use in the container or its con-
tents, but does own the automobile in which the container was found, has not been addressed 
explicitly by the Supreme Court. Whether an occupant of an automobile would have standing to 
challenge the opening by police of a container he does own when that container is found within an 
automobile he does not own or lease also is unclear. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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conduct a warrantless search of such containers under Chimel if such 
containers are within the actual lunge, grasp, or immediate control of an 
arrested occupant of an automobile, because Chimel does not limit police 
searches of the immediate control area to items of personal property 
owned by the arrestee. 147 Still, Chadwick should prohibit the warrantless 
search of such containers when the containers are within the exclusive 
control of the police l48 and there are no exigent circumstances. 149 
III. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES UNDER THE 
"AUTOMOBILE" EXCEPTION (CARROLL DOCTRINE) 
Under the' 'automobile exception" to the general requirement that a 
warrant precede a search or seizure (also known as the Carroll doc-
trine 1 SO), police may stop and search an automobile without a warrant if 
two criteria are met. First, they must have probable cause to believe that 
the automobile contains contraband or other items that can be seized 
under the fourth amendment. I S I Second, there must be exigent cir-
147. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra notes 42-43, 48-49 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 44-45 and infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
150. This reference is to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in which the Supreme 
Court first recognized this exception. This exception should be called the Carroll doctrine rather than 
the automobile exception, because it extends beyond automobiles to airplanes, ships, and motor-
boats to the extent that they are inherently mobile and can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction 
before a warrant can be obtained. See id. at 153; W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2 at 508-09 n. 2. 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 11 (1977), however, refused to extend this exception to 
authorize warrantless searches of movable personal property, such as luggage. See supra note 41. 
The automobile exception has also been held inapplicable to motor homes on the grounds that 
they have tinted glass or shades so that passers-by cannot peer in and are "in some senses more akin 
to a house than a car." United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322,1326 (9th Cir. 1980). 
151. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 149; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Such 
probable cause can be based upon facts personally obtained by law enforcement officials and obser-
vations personally made by them, Carroll, 267 U.S. 132; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); by 
information provided by informants, Ross, 456 U.S. 798; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), 
or by witnesses or victims of crime, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 
U.S. 67 (1975); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980). Probable cause also may be established on 
the basis of an anonymous tip corroborated by lawful observations of the inside of an automobile by 
police, United States v. Bryant, 580 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1978), or by information acquired and obser-
vations made by police after they have made a lawful investigative stop of an automobile. Texas v. 
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1525 (1983); United States v. Pillo, 522 F. Supp. 855 (M.D. Pa. 1981). 
The Supreme Court recently has adopted a "totality of circumstances" test for determining 
when there is probable cause to believe that seizable items will be found in a particular place. Illinois 
v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). The Gales Court abandoned the stricter "two-pronged test" for 
probable cause of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969), which required the prosecution to establish both the basis of knowledge and the veracity of 
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cum stances making it impracticable or dangerous for them to await the 
issuance of a warrant. I 52 The reasons for the' 'automobile exception" are 
that "the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable 
to obtain a warrant" and "the configuration, use, and regulation of 
automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that 
exists with respect to differently situated property." I 53 
Although the Court has not said so explicitly, the presence of exigent 
circumstances within the meaning of the automobile exception is deter-
mined on a case by case basis. 154 Exigent circumstances exist under the 
automobile exception when it would be impractical or dangerous for one 
officer to guard the automobile while other officers obtain a warrant, 
because the automobile's occupants, unapprehended accomplices, or 
members of the public might remove contraband or other seizable items 
from the automobile, or might remove the automobile itself. 155 Factors 
relevant in making this determination include the location of the 
automobile when it is first stopped or found prior to the search, the 
number of law enforcement officers present, and the number of occu-
pants, if any, in the automobile. I 56 Exigent circumstances "do not 
the source of the information upon which probable cause was sought to be based. See Moylan, Hear-
say and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). 
The first cases allowing warrantless searches of automobiles under the automobile exception 
involved searches for the seizure of contraband (such as illicit bootleg liquor), Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62 n.7 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Later 
cases have involved the search for and seizure of evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of crime. 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 
U.S. 1 (1980). See generally, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, most lower courts have held that an 
automobile can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception when law enforce-
ment officials have probable cause (reasonable grounds) to believe that the automobile contains 
some type of seizable item, but do not know or even suspect what specific type of item is in the 
automobile (so that a search warrant particularly describing the items to be seized could not be 
issued in accordance with the fourth amendment). See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2 (d). In such 
cases, these courts have had difficulty defining the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile 
exception search. [d.; see infra notes 180-321 and accompanying text. 
152. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51; Coolidgev. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478-79 
(1971); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
A warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under the automobile exception if these two 
criteria are met even when the police do not seize the automobile. United States v. Modica, 663 F .2d 
1173 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982). 
153. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979)(citations omitted). See also United States 
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12-13 (1977), discussed supra note 41; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1925). 
154. See Chambers V. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51; Coolidge V. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
458-64 (plurality opinion), 478-80 (1971). 
155. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (1971)(plurality opinion); England v. 
State, 274 Md. 264, 335 A.2d 98 (1975). 
156. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (plurality opinion), 478-80 (1971). 
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dissipate simply because the particular occupants ofthe vehicle may have 
been removed from the car, arrested, or otherwise restricted in their 
freedom of movement. ... The car is readily moveable until such time as 
it is seized, removed from the scene and securely impounded by the 
police. Until then it is potentially accessible to third persons who might 
move or damage it or remove or destroy evidence contained in it." In 
Furthermore, exigent circumstances are not limited to those occasions 
when the defendant has been alerted to police actions taken against him, 
because of the possibility that unapprehended accomplices or members 
of the public might remove evidence from the automobile or take or drive 
it away.ISS The Court has always found exigent circumstances when an 
automobile is stopped by law enforcement officers while being operated 
on a public road or highway.ls9 This situation, however, is not the only 
157. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311, 1323 (1981). 
158. Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 292 Pa. Super. 273, 437 A.2d 41 (1981). 
In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court noted that "historically warrantless 
searches of vessels, wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as a home or other 
building-had been considered reasonable by Congress," id. at 805, because in the case of "a search 
of a ship, motorboat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, ... it is not practicable to secure 
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the 
warrant must be sought." [d. at 806 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153). "Thus, since 
its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving 
the transportation of contraband goods. (In light of this established history, individuals always had 
been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable 
cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior 
evaluation of those facts.) It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided 
the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized 
that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance. In this 
class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable." 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 806-07. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n. 9, stated that "the decision in Carrol/was not based on 
the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate search .... [Allthough a 
failure to seize a moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of the 
illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does not necessarily justify a war-
rantless search .... " The Court in Ross noted that in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), 
the Court' 'refused to adopt a rule that would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless 
search. The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of 
an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an immediate search of the contents of that 
vehicle. 'For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and 
holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carry-
ing out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is 
reasonable underthe Fourth Amendment.' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52." 456 U.S. at 807 
n. 9. See infra note 176. 
159. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Hustyv. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1939); 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Michigan v. Thomas, 
102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982) (per curiam). 
In Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. at 3081, the Supreme Court observed that its prior decisions 
had established the rule "that when police officers have probable cause to believe there is contra-
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example of exigent circumstances. 160 The Court has also permitted a war-
rantless search of an automobile under the automobile exception when a 
lone police officer encountered the operator and two passengers of an 
automobile he had been following. 161 
In Cardwell v. Lewis, 162 a plurality of four members of the Supreme 
Court found exigent circumstances to have been present at the time an 
unoccupied automobile parked in a public lot was searched and seized by 
police without a warrant. Exigent circumstances were present, because 
there "was incentive and potential for the car's removal"; the 
automobile's owner had been arrested; he was aware that the police 
believed that the automobile itself was incriminating evidence; 163 and, he 
band inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless 
search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody." The Court in 
Thomas then stated that' 'it is clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does 
not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court's assess-
ment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been tampered with, during the 
period required for the police to obtain a warrant." [d. (footnote omitted). The Thomas Court 
agreed that even if "exigent circumstances" were a "necessary predicate" to a search of an 
automobile which police have stopped on the road, such an exigency is presented by the "clear 
possibility that the occupants of the vehicle could have had unknown confederates who would return 
to remove the secreted contraband." [d. at 3081 n. 2 (quoting People v. Thomas, 106 Mich. App. 
601,609,308 N.W. 2d 170,174 (1981) (Deneweth, J., dissenting), rev'd 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982». 
Justice White, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. at 525, noted that in Husty police obtained information from an informant that gave them 
probable cause to believe that a particular automobile parked at a specific location contained 
seizable items. Later, the police discovered the automobile parked and unattended, but waited until 
Husty and others entered the automobile and started to drive away. At that point, and without 
obtaining a warrant, they stopped the automobile and searched it. As Justice White also noted in 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 526, the Court in Husty upheld the warrantless stop and search as reasonable 
under the fourth amendment because the police did "not know when Husty would come to the car or 
how soon it would be removed" and, therefore, the officers were not "required to speculate upon 
the chances of successfully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal from the scene of 
one or more officers which would have been necessary to procure a warrant." Husty v. United 
States, 282 U.S. at 701. 
160. Justice White argued in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Coolidge that police 
should be able to search an automobile under the automobile exception when there is probable 
cause, whether an automobile is stopped while moving, parked on the street, or in a person's 
driveway, because "in both situations the probability of movement at the instance of family or 
friends is equally great. ... " 403 U.S. at 525 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). 
161. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam). The Court in Bannister did not 
explicitly discuss why the facts of the case satisfied the exigent circumstances requirement of the 
automobile exception. It simply upheld the warrantless seizure of evidence the officer observed 
inside the car after he approached it and which he had probable cause to believe were seizable items. 
[d. at 4. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) and the analysis of Scher in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459 n. 17 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
162. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). 
163. The automobile had been used to push another automobile containing the body of a 
murder victim over an embankment. [d. at 586. 
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had requested his attorney to see "that his wife and family got the 
car. "164 (The plurality in Cardwell, however, did not state that the police 
overheard the defendant making this request to his attorney.) The 
plurality found exigent circumstances, despite the fact that "for some 
time prior to arrest"16S the police had had probable cause to believe that 
the automobile in question constituted evidence and an instrumentality 
of crime: 
[T]he right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car 
under exigent circumstances are not foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained 
at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles 
are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises 
only at the time of arrest. ... The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact 
that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does 
not negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt 
police action. 166 
164. [d. at 595. 
The plurality stated that the subsequent examination of the exterior of the automobile, during 
which a sample of paint and an imprint of a tire were taken, was not a search within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment, so that a warrant was not required for this exterior examination. [d. at 
588-92. See supra note 6. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on different grounds. Four 
Justices dissented, primarily on the grounds that there were no exigent circumstances within the 
meaning of the automobile exception, 417 U.S. at 596-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See infra notes 
167-69 and accompanying text. 
See also England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 334 A.2d 98 (1975), in which exigent circumstances 
were found justifying the search of an unoccupied automobile parked on the street in front of the 
defendant's house. In England, the Court based its conclusion on the facts that, although the defen-
dant was in custody, an accomplice was at large and the automobile appeared unexpectedly in front 
of the defendant's house after the police had been searching for it for three days. 
165. 417 U.S. at 595. 
166. [d. 
The Supreme Court has never held that exigent circumstances will not be found if it is estab-
lished that the police waited until an item was placed in an automobile as a pretext for taking advan-
tage of the automobile exception. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 840 (I 982)(Marshall, J., 
dissenting). In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court suggested that the SUbjective 
motive of police officers is irrelevant in determining whether their conduct was unreasonable in 
violation of the fourth amendment. 
See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), discussed supra note 159; Nair v. State, 51 Md. 
App. 234, 442 A.2d 196 (1982) (exigent circumstances held to be present even though police had 
probable cause to obtain a warrant authorizing search of automobile two days earlier on the grounds 
that police were under no obligation to conclude an investigation or arrest the defendants at the time 
that probable cause was first obtained); Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 292 Pa. Super. 273, 437 A.2d 
41 (1981) (exigent circumstances held to be present when police inadvertently came upon an 
automobile while they were on the way to obtain a warrant authorizing search of that automobile, 
even though police voluntarily delayed seeking the warrant until two and one-half hours after they 
had acquired probable cause to search the automobile). Cf. State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 397 A.2d 
1062 (1979) (no exigent circumstances held to be present when police had probable cause to obtain a 
warrant authorizing search of an automobile in advance of search of the automobile and also knew 
well in advance of the search that it would be found outside an apartment which they had a warrant 
to search). 
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Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, 
argued that exigent circumstances were not present, because the defen-
dant (the owner of the automobile) and the keys to his automobile "were 
securely within police custody ... well before the time the automobile 
was seized," and thus "there was ... absolutely no likelihood that the 
respondent could have either moved the car or meddled with it during the 
time necessary to obtain a search warrant. And there was no realistic 
possibility that anyone else was in a position to do so. "167 Justice Stewart 
also pointed out that the defendant had been aware for several months 
that the police were investigating him and had known for at least a day 
before the seizure of his automobile that the police wished to question 
him.168 Furthermore, the police had had time to obtain an arrest warrant 
for the defendant based upon a showing of probable cause that also 
would have supported issuance of a search warrant authorizing search of 
the automobile. 169 
In contrast with Cardwell is Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 170 a:noth~r 
Gase qealing with the seizure and search of a parked and unoccupied 
~utomobile, and the only such case in which a majority of the Justices on 
the Supreme Court have held that there were no exigent circumstances 
within the meaning of the automobile exception. In Coolidge, the 
automobile in question was seized, searched two days later, held over a 
year, and then searched again twice. All of this police conduct was con-
gpct~q pursuant to a search warrant that was held invalid by the Supreme 
Coprt. This holding placed the burden on the St~te to esta\llish th~t the 
(npw) warrantless seizure and search of that automobile w~s vaHg. The 
rn~jority in Coolidge determined that the automobile ip question w~s 
s.~i?e~ while it was parked in the qriveway of the owner's home ~Qd was 
npt being used for an illegal purpose, and at a time when tQe police had 
prgb~ble cause and had had sufficient opportunity to obt~ifl il warr~nt. 
Th~ {::ollrt thus concluded that there were no exigem circum.stilI}G~~ justi-
fyjng the warrantless seizure and search of the ilutomobHe \.mq~r the 
~ytompbile exception. 171 A plurality of four Justices ~lso n9t~q, ~s addi-
ti~m'!! b~rs to application of the automobile exceptlon, th~t the 
gefen9~nt, the automobile's owner, had been arrested, anq that his wife, 
the only other possible driver of the automobile, had been removed from 
tQ~ sGene by police officers who stayed with her until after the warrantless 
167. 417 u.s. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
168. [d. at 599. 
169. [d. at 598. 
170. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
171. [d. at 479,484. 
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seizure of the automobile. 172 Justice Black, in a concurring and dissent-
ing opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that the plurality incor-
rectly assumed that "the police should, or even could, continue to keep 
petitioner's wife effectively under house arrest," and that the police did 
not act unreasonably in refusing to assume "that no one else had any 
motivation to alter or remove the car. "173 Justice White, in a concurring 
and dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued that the 
automobile exception should permit police to conduct warrantless 
searches of automobiles they have probable cause to believe contain 
seizable items in two situations: first, when an automobile is in motion 
prior to being stopped and searched and, second, when an automobile is 
unattended and parked on the street or in the driveway of a person's 
home, because "in both situations the probability of movement at the 
instance of family or friends is equally clear." 174 
As these decisions indicate, exigent circumstances under the 
automobile exception are determined on a case by case basis. This conclu-
sion is supported by the fact that each time the Court has applied the 
automobile exception, it has analyzed in great detail the particular facts 
of the case before determining whether exigent circumstances were 
present. 17S In substance, the Court appears to approach the exigent cir-
cumstances issue by determining whether the police could have obtained 
a warrant before seizing or searching an automobile, and what the conse-
quences would have been if the police, after stopping or encountering the 
automobile, had sought a warrant before seizing and searching it. 176 
172. [d. at 460. See Humphrey v. State, 39 Md. App. 484, 386 A.2d 1238 (1978). 
173. 403 U.S. at 505 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
174. [d. at 525 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Marshall argued in dissent in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 830 n. 2 (1982), that 
"the fact that the police are able initially to remove the occupants from the car does not remove the 
justification for an immediate search. If police could not conduct an immediate search of a stopped 
automobile, they would often be left with the difficult task of deciding what to do with the occupants 
while a warrant is obtained. In the case of a parked automobile, by contrast, if the automobile is 
unoccupied, this problem is not presented." 
175. See supra notes 154-74 and accompanying text. 
176. The interpretation of the exigent circumstances element of the automobile exception by 
lower federal courts and by state courts is analyzed in depth in W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, §§ 7.2 (b), 
(c); this article will not duplicate that analysis. 
When exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless automobile exception search of an 
automobile are present at the time the vehicle is stopped or first encountered by law enforcement 
officials, the officials are permitted by the automobile exception to tow or drive it to a police station 
or an impoundment lot and search it there without securing a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). The Court in these two cases has 
permitted such delayed searches without requiring law enforcement officials to explain or establish 
good cause as to why they delayed searching the automobile until well after it was initially stopped or 
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found by them. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. at 69 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part in Chambers, disagreed with this per se rule permitting such 
delayed automobile exception searches on the grounds that an exception from the rule generally 
requiring a warrant for a search should be permitted only when the actual facts of the case before the 
court establish exigent circumstances. 399 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Cf. supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. The Court also has imposed no limits on the 
length of the delay permissible between the seizure of an automobile and its search at the station 
house or impoundment lot. See People v. White, 68 Mich. App. 348, 242 N.W.2d 579 (1976) 
(warrantless search next morning 18 hours after automobile seized late the afternoon of the 
preceding day upheld under the automobile exception); People v. Emert, I Ill. App. 3d 993, 274 
N .E.2d 364 (1971) (warrantless search three days after seizure of automobile held invalid under 
automobile exception). In support of this per se rule permitting delayed automobile exception 
searches, the Court reasoned that it is a "debatable question" as to whether seizure and immobiliza-
tion of the automobile until a search warrant is obtained is a greater or lesser intrusion than immedi-
ately searching the automobile at the station house by law enforcement officials; thus, for fourth 
amendment purposes, there is "no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car 
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an 
immediate search without a warrant." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51. Ross reaffirmed the 
holdings in Chambers v. Maroney and Texas v. White on the following grounds: 
These decisions are based on the practicalities of the situations presented and a 
realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for 
privacy interests. Given the scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an 
automobile-which often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the court 
rejected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either to post a 
guard at the vehicle While a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehicle itself to the station. 
Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene could be conducted, but not one at the sta-
tion if the vehicle is impounded, police often simply would search the vehicle on the 
street-at no advantage to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The 
rules as applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, however, a 
reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual gives the police probable 
cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he luses the right to proceed on his 
way without official interference. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n. 9 (1982). Justice Harlan, however, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part in Chambers v. Maroney, argued that the majority's reasoning in Chambers did 
not support the per se rule it adopted, because the majority, "unable to decide whether search or 
temporary seizure is the 'lesser' intrusion, in this case authorized both." 399 U.S. at 63 n. 8 (Harlan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also noted that the Court approved the warrantless 
searches of the automobile at the police station, after the warrantless temporary seizure of the 
automobile, "without even an inquiry into the officers' ability promptly to take their case before a 
magistrate." Id. See also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. at 69 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan 
concluded his opinion in Chambers by arguing that the "lesser intrusion" would be the "simple 
seizure of the car for the period-perhaps a day-necessary to enable the officers to obtain a war-
rant," 399 U.S. at 63, and that temporary seizure and immobilization of an automobile, without a 
warrantless search of the automobile, would prevent removal of evidence while a warrant was 
obtained. Id. He conceded, however, that when it would be impracticable to immobilize the 
automobile for the time necessary to obtain a warrant, such as when a single police officer arrests the 
occupants of an automobile and must take them to the police station, the automobile exception 
should permit the officer to make a warrantless on-the-spot search of the automobile ifthere is prob-
able cause to believe it contains seizable items. Id. at 64 n. 9. (He also noted that if his theory was 
followed, a person could consent to the warrantless search of his automobile in order to avoid tem-
porary seizure of his automobile while police obtain a search warrant.) 
A majority of lower federal and state courts have refused to interpret the automobile exception 
as requiring police, when they have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains seizable 
items and there are exigent circumstances, to post a guard and to deny use and access to the 
automobile while other police obtain a warrant authorizing the search of the automobile. See W. LA 
FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2(c). 
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Unlike a warrantless search of an automobile incident to a lawful 
arrest under Chimel and Belton, the warrantless search of an automobile 
under the automobile exception does not require as a prerequisite that an 
occupant of the automobile have been arrested contemporaneously with 
the search of the automobile. 177 In fact, there need not be any occupants 
in an automobile for the automobile exception to apply, 178 although the 
absence of occupants in an automobile may cause a court to invalidate 
the warrantless search on the grounds that no exigent circumstances were 
present. 179 A warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile 
exception is permitted when there is probable cause to believe that there 
are seizable items in the automobile that may be removed or destroyed 
before a warrant is obtained (not necessarily by the occupants of the 
automobile; possibly by unapprehended accomplices or members of the 
public). A warrantless search of an automobile as a search incident to a 
lawful arrest under Chimel and Belton, on the other hand, does not 
require probable cause to believe or even suspect that there are seizable 
items such as weapons or evidence in the automobile. Under Belton, a 
warrantless search of an automobile is permitted to prevent evidence 
from being concealed, removed, or destroyed, and to protect the safety 
of the arresting officers and nearby members of the public in the event 
that the automobile contains evidence or a weapon and an arrested occu-
pant lunges or grasps for such evidence or weapon. 
When the police do not have reason to believe that the item to be 
seized is in a specific area of or container within the automobile, the 
automobile exception permits police to search areas of an automobile 
where they could reasonably expect to find the items.I8o A warrantless 
177. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 373 (1979). 
178. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); England v. State, 274 Md. 264, 334 
A.2d 98 (1975). 
179. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Cj. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583,596 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
180. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross, the Court indicated that police may 
rip open upholstery without a warrant, id. at 818, 823 (at least when the upholstery feels harder than 
is ordinarily the case, id. at 804, quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 174), and may 
sellrch concealed compartments under the dashboard, 456 U.S. at 818,825, and the glove compart-
ment. [d. at 821,823. 
See, e.g., Daugherty v. State, 40 Md. App. 535, 392 A.2d 1165 (1978)(opening by game warden 
of paper bag and seizure by him of three plastic bags filled with marijuana, after he determined by 
feeling the outside of the bag that it did not contain anything sufficiently hard or heavy to be game, 
held to exceed the permissible scope of an automobile exception search); Madonado v. State, 528 
S. W .2d 234 (Tex. Crim. 1975) (examination of identification numbers and search of glove compart-
ment, floorboards, and rear area of truck believed to be stolen, where documents or other items that 
would disclose the true owner's identity might be found, permissible under the automobile excep-
tion, but ripping up the floorboards of the rear area of the truck (under which packages of mari-
juana were found), held to exceed the permissible scope of an automobile exception search). 
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search of the trunk of an automobile, therefore, may be permitted under 
the automobile exception when police have probable cause to believe that 
a seizable item is located somewhere in the automobile, but do not know 
where in the automobile it is. 181 A warrantless search of the trunk of an 
automobile, however, is not permitted as a search incident to a lawful 
arrest under Belton. 182 Furthermore, the scope of a search of an 
automobile under the automobile exception is not limited to the area 
within the lunge, grasp, or immediate control of an arrested occupant of 
the automobile. 183 If law enforcement officials, however, have probable 
cause to believe that a seizable item is located in a specific area of an 
automobile (which might be the case if probable cause is based on an 
informant's tip), then, under the automobile exception, they usually 
should be required to search without a warrant only that specified area of 
the automobile. 184 It is possible, however, that police officers in such a 
situation might approach an occupied automobile and observe a furtive 
gesture by an occupant adjacent to the area of the automobile believed by 
the officers to contain seizable items. In such a case, and if they do not 
find the seizable items in the specific area in which they have probable 
cause to believe the items will be found, 18S they should be permitted to 
search the area within that occupant's immediate control. 186 Another 
example might involve police officers who, having probable cause to 
believe that a specific quantity of a particular type of seizable item will be 
found in a specified area of an automobile, find less than such specific 
quantity in that specified area. In this situation, they should be permitted 
to search other areas of the automobile where the additional unseized 
quantities of that item might be hidden. Such additional searching should 
be permitted, because suspicious criminals might decide, at some time 
after the police obtained the information upon which they based their 
probable cause, to transfer some or all of the seizable items to a different 
181. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371 (1979). Cf, State v. Astalos, 160 
N.J. Super. 407, 390 A.2d 144 (1978). See also People v. Fraijo, 78 Cal. App.3d 977, 144 Cal. 
Rptr. 424 (1978). 
182. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
183. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371,373 (1979). 
184. Cf, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), discussed infra notes 250-321 and accom: 
panying text; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (police who had probable cause to believe 
that a particular suitcase located in an automobile contained seizable items permitted to seize the 
suitcase without a warrant, but needed a warrant to open the suitcase and seize its contents), ana-
lyzed infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text. 
185. Cf, Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 449 n.9 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 n. 3 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), discussed infra 
note 206. 
186. C/. Chime) v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra notes 31-35 and infra note 206 
and accompanying text. 
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area of the automobile to reduce the likelihood that the entire quantity 
might be intercepted by the police or criminal adversaries. 187 
The automobile exception, however, does not authorize the 
warrantless search of an occupant of an automobile that the police have 
probable cause to believe contains seizable items when that search is to 
determine if the occupant has concealed such seizable items on his per-
son. 188 The reason for this prohibition is twofold: first, police cannot 
obtain a search warrant authorizing the search of the person of an occu-
pant of an automobile when they have probable cause to believe only that 
seizable items are located somewhere in the automobile; and, second, the 
scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception should not 
be greater than would be permitted under a search warrant. 189 
A recurring problem with respect to the permissible scope of a search 
under the automobile exception occurs when police officers, while 
searching an automobile which they reasonably believe contains a par-
ticular type of seizable item, discover some of that type of item but have 
no information as to the quantity of that type of item in the automobile or 
where in the automobile to find it. The Court has not explicitly decided 
whether police in such a situation can continue to search the automobile 
for additional quantities. 190 A further search should be permitted only 
if the circumstances of the particular case give the police probable cause 
to believe that there are within the automobile additional quantities 
of the type or kind of seizable items already discovered and seized within 
the automobile. 191 
187. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 449 n. 9 (Stevens, J., dissenting); and Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 770 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), discussed infra note 206. 
188. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
189. [d. In Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 292 Pa. Super. 273,437 A.2d 41 (1981) the court held 
that if police have probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile is carrying a weapon or 
another seizable item on his person, and if there are exigent circumstances, the automobile exception 
authorizes police, without a warrant, to stop the automobile and search the person of that indi-
vidual. The Burgwin court, however, did not cite or distinguish Di Re. 
190. Such a factual situation was presented in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), 
wherein a police officer, after finding marijuana in the passenger compartment of a station wagon 
he had stopped because it had been driven erratically, opened the wagon's tailgate and lifted up the 
recessed luggage compartment, in which he discovered 15 pounds of marijuana in two bundles 
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The Court in Robbins, however, did not address the issue of 
whether the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a search under the automobile exception, and 
decided the case on other grounds. See infra notes 215-49 and accompanying text. See also Michigan 
v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079, 3081 n. I (1982), wherein the Court noted that a lower appellate court 
"apparently assumed" that the discovery of marijuana in an automobile's glove compartment 
"provided probable cause to believe there was contraband hidden elsewhere in the vehicle." 
191. In State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211,440 A.2d 1311 (1981), two police officers, while chasing a 
speeding automobile, observed "three of the four occupants moving about in the vehicle, as if 
attempting to conceal something." [d., 440 A.2d at 1313. After stopping the automobile, oneofthe 
1983] WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AUTOMOBILES 43 
The most troublesome issue for the Court, however, has been the 
issue of whether police may open and inspect the contents of luggage and 
other closed opaque containers discovered during an automobile excep-
tion search. This issue has been addressed recently by the Court in three 
cases l92 that present questions about the extent to which Chadwick'sl93 
exclusive control and exigency standards 194 regulate the warrantless 
opening and inspection of the contents of luggage, containers, and other 
items of personal property discovered in an automobile during an 
automobile exception search; the types of personal property subject to 
Chadwick's exclusive control standard; and, the permissible scope of the 
warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile exception. 
In Arkansas v. Sanders,195 police officers had probable cause to 
believe that a particular suitcase carried by a disembarking airline 
police officers observed shotgun shells in the glove compartment, which had been opened by the 
automobile's driver in response to a request by one of the officers for the automobile's registration. 
The police then ordered the occupants to leave the automobile, following which one of the officers 
entered the automobile to seize the shotgun shells. While doing so, the officer observed an opaque 
plastic bag lying on the floor, protruding about 12 inches from under the seat. The bag felt as if 
it contained a gun, so the officer opened it. He discovered and seized a sawed-off shotgun. The 
officers then made a further search of the passenger compartment, finding and seizing several 
revolvers. The court found that the presence of the "shotgun shells in the glove compartment and 
the sawed-off shotgun under the front passenger seat, coupled with defendants' furtive and unusual 
movements in the back seat before the vehicle was stopped," gave the police probable cause to 
conduct the search of the passenger compartment that revealed the two handguns. [d., 440 A.2d 
at 1321, 1322. 
In Wimberlyv. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557,128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P.2d417 (1976), a police 
officer, after stopping an automobile that he had observed being driven erratically, observed a pipe 
and approximately 12 marijuana seeds on the automobile's floor. Smelling the odor of burnt mari-
juana, he searched the passenger compartment, and found a small quantity of marijuana in the 
pocket of a jacket. He then searched the trunk and found a suitcase containing several pounds of 
marijuana. The court ruled that the search of the passenger compartment for additional marijuana 
was permissible under the automobile exception, because "the observation of even an unusable 
quantity of marijuana has been deemed sufficient to justify the search of a vehicle for additional 
contraband." [d., 547 P.2d at 421. See Hill v. State, 516 S.W. 2d 361 (Tenn. App. 1974)(warrantless 
search of glove compartment upheld under automobile exception after police officer had discovered 
plastic bag of marijuana in plain view on the front seat of the automobile). The court in Wimberly, 
however, held that the warrantless search of the automobile's trunk was not permissible under the 
automobile exception in the absence of "specific articulable facts which gave reasonable cause to 
believe that seizable items are, in fact, concealed in the trunk." 547 P .2d at 424. The Wimberly court 
concluded that the officer's observations and the discovery of a small amount of marijuana in the 
jacket in the passenger compartment only would give the police reasonable grounds to believe that 
the occupants were users of marijuana, not dealers of marijuana, and it was thus not reasonable to 
infer that additional marijuana was hidden in the trunk. 
192. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
193. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
194. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text. 
195. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
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passenger contained marijuana. The person carrying the suitcase entered 
a taxicab, which the police pursued and stopped several blocks from the 
airport. Without a warrant or the consent of the owner, the police seized 
the suitcase and opened it. The Court held that, although the warrantless 
seizure of the suitcase was permissible under the automobile exception 
because the police had probable cause to believe that it contained contra-
band and that it was being driven away, 196 the opening of the suitcase and 
the seizure of its contents without a search warrant violated the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution. 197 After reiterating the general rules that 
a warrant usually is required for a search or seizure,198 and that the 
"few" exceptions to the usual requirement of a warrant are "jealously 
and carefully drawn," 199 the Court determined that the police, after 
seizing the suitcase, should have taken it and its owner to the police sta-
tion and then obtained a warrant authorizing the search of the suitcase200 
and the seizure of its contents. 201 The Court in Sanders held that Chad-
wick202 prohibited the police from opening and searching without a war-
rant luggage discovered during a warrantless automobile exception 
search once they have the luggage within their exclusive control. 203 The 
search would be prohibited even if the police have probable cause to 
196. Id. at 761. See United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844, 4845 (U.S. June 20, 1983) 
("Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contra-
band or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the [Fourth) 
Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its con-
tents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the war-
rant requirement is present"). Cj. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), analyzed supra note 
159. Chief Justice Burger argued in his concurring opinion in Sanders that the case did not involve an 
application of the automobile exception, because, as in Chadwick, the relationship between the suit-
case and the taxicab "was purely coincidental." 442 U.S. at 767. He argued that the case simply 
involved an application of Chadwick's rule, which generally requires a warrant in order to inspect 
the contents of luggage. Id. at 766. This analysis was quoted approvingly by a majority of the Court 
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 811-12. 
197. 442 U.S. at 765-66. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court should have sup-
pressed as evidence the marijuana seized in the suitcase at the suitcase owner's state criminal trial on 
charges of illegal possession of the marijuana with intent to deliver. See id. at 756, 766. 
198. Id. at 758. 
199. [d. at 759 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958». 
200. The Sanders Court implicitly assumed that the opening by the police of the unlocked suit-
case was a fourth amendment search, which requires a finding that such conduct violates the owner's 
actual and reasonable expectations of privacy. See supra note 6. If such police conduct had been held 
not to be a fourth amendment search, the opening of the suitcase would not have been subject to the 
warrant, probable cause, or reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. Id.; see infra 
note 208 and accompanying text. 
201. 442 U.S. at 766. 
202. 433 U.S. I (1977). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
203. 442 U.S. at 762. See text accompanying notes 48-50. 
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believe that the luggage contains seizable items204 unless "special exigen-
cies of the situation justify the warrantless search. ,,20S In Sanders, the 
Court concluded that Chadwick's exclusive control standard required 
this result even though the suitcase at issue was not locked and was' 'com-
paratively small" (when compared with the locked, 200-pound 
footlocker involved in Chadwick), because the suitcase, as "a repository 
for personal, private effects," was entitled to the protection of the fourth 
amendment's warrant requirement. 206 
204. Id. at 765. 
205. 442 U.S. at 763 n. 11. The Court stated that "generally ... such exigencies will depend 
upon the probable contents of the luggage and the suspect's access to those contents-not upon 
whether the luggage is taken from an automobile." [d. The Court suggested that such an exigency 
would exist if the police had reason to suspect that a suitcase contained a weapon. Id. The Court's 
reference to the "suspect's access to those contents" implies that the determination of whether exi-
gent circumstances are present also might be based upon Chimers immediate control standard. Cf, 
supra notes 21-35, 44-45. and accompanying text. This latter definition of exigency, however, 
appears to be simply a situation in which the suitcase would not be within the exclusive control of the 
police within the meaning of Chadwick. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Sanders' 
tests for defining exigency in cases involving the automobile exception, however, should be more 
broadly defined to apply to situations in which the suitcase or other container and its contents are 
within the immediate control of any occupant of the automobile, whether or not an occupant has 
been arrested, because an automobile exception search does not require any occupants of the 
automobile to have been arrested. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
206. 442 U.S. at 762 n. 9. 
Chief Justice Burger argued in his concurring opinion in Sanders that the case did not present 
"the question of whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when the police have prob-
able cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not know 
whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or con-
cealed in some part of the car's structure." 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C. J., concurring). He said that 
he was "not sure whether that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant to search 
the suitcase when a warrantless search of the automobile is otherwise permissible." Id. He added 
that' 'it would be better to await a case in which the question must be decided." Id. (Such a case was 
presented in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), analyzed infra notes 250-321 and accom-
panying text). The majority in Sanders, however, did not make any distinction between the 
hypothetical situation raised by Chief Justice Burger and the situation presented by the facts of 
Sanders (wherein the police had probable cause to believe seizable items are in a 'particular piece of 
luggage). See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text. The Court did draw such a distinction 
subsequently in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), limiting Sanders to cases in which police 
have probable cause to believe that a seizable item is located in a specific piece of luggage or con-
tainer. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text. 
Justice Blackmun argued in Sanders that, contrary to what he asserted were the implications of 
these statements by Chief Justice Burger, the automobile exception might permit the warrantless 
search of luggage discovered in an automobile when the police do have probable cause to believe 
only that seizable items are somewhere in the automobile, but do not have probable cause to believe 
that the items are in any specific container. He argued: 
[T]he intrusion on privacy, and consequently the need for the protection of the War-
rant Clause, is, if anything, greater when the police search the entire interior area of the 
car, including possibly several suitcases, than when they confine their search to a single 
suitcase. Moreover, given the easy transferability of articles to and from luggage once it is 
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The majority in Sanders supported the application of Chadwick's 
exclusive control standards to luggage discovered in automobiles during 
a warrantless automobile exception search for two reasons: first, once 
police have seized a suitcase and have it securely within their control 
the extent of its mobility is not affected by the fact that it was taken 
from an automobile;207 and, second, a suitcase in an automobile is not 
attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with lug-
gage taken from other locations. This is so, because' 'the very purpose of 
a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to 
transport them. "208 
The Sanders Court did suggest in dictum, however, that some con-
tainers and packages other than suitcases and luggage would not be 
subject to Chadwick's exclusive control standard requiring a warrant to 
placed in a vehicle, the police would be entitled to assume that if contraband was not found 
in the suspect suitcase, it would likely be secreted somewhere else in the car. The possibility 
the opinion concurring in the judgment would preserve for future decision thus con-
templates the following two-step ritual: first, the police would take the targeted suitcase 
to the station for a search pursuant to a warrant; then, if the contraband was not discov-
ered in the suitcase, they would return for a warrantless search of other luggage and 
compartments of the car. It does not require the adjudication of a future controversy to 
reject that result. 
442 U.S. at 770 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun concluded by arguing that the 
Court should adopt a rule permitting the warrantless search and seizure of any personal property 
found in an automobile that permissibly was seized and is being searched under the automobile 
exception.ld. at 772. See infra note 208. The Court subsequently did adopt a rule authorizing police 
to search any containers that might contain the items to be seized when the police have probable 
cause only to believe that the items are located somewhere in the automobile. United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text. 
207. 442 U.S. at 763. 
208. Id. at 764. The Court also stated that "one is not less inclined to place private, personal 
possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than 
transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored." Id. These latter two statements in 
Sanders implied that the opening and inspection of the contents of a suitcase discovered in an 
automobile are a fourth amendment search. See supra note 200. 
The majority in Sanders rejected an argument applying by analogy a statement in Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (analyzed supra note 176), that suggested there is no constitutional dif-
ference between a situation in which police search an automobile stopped on a highway without a 
warrant under the automobile exception and one in which they hold the automobile but delay the 
search until a warrant is obtained. 442 U.S. at 765 n. 14. Application of the analysis to luggage 
discovered in an automobile during a search under the automobile exception would have permitted 
its warrantless search, but this argument was rejected on the grounds that requiring police to hold a 
seized vehicle until a warrant is obtained would impose "severe, even impossible, burdens on many 
police departments;" burdens that would not be imposed if police departments are required to seize 
and hold personal luggage until a warrant is obtained before opening and searching the contents of 
the luggage. Id. (By implication, the Court in Sanders was stating that warrantless searches of 
automobiles such as those involved in Chambers (where a moving vehicle was stopped) are not 
unreasonable searches because the adverse impact upon law enforcement if a warrant were required 
outweighs the intrusions upon personal privacy resulting from such searches. See infra notes 269-73 
and accompanying text). 
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open containers and inspect their contents. 209 Sanders suggests that two 
types of containers can be opened without a warrant: containers, such as 
a kit of burglar tools or a gun case, that by "their very nature cannot sup~ 
port any reasonable expectation of privacy, because their contents can be 
inferred from their outward appearance;"210 and containers whose con-
tents are open to "plain view. "211 The Court stated that' 'our decision in 
this case means only that a warrant generally is required before personal 
luggage can be searched and that the extent to which the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to containers depends not at all upon whether they a:r;e 
Justice B1ackmun also argued in dissent in Sanders that police should be permitted under ~he 
automobile exception to search luggage and similar containers found in an automobile wit\1o\lt l!, 
warrant, because luggage, like an automobile, is mobile, 442 U.S. at 769, because "the exp<:c~aH9n 
of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is probably not significantly greater than the expectatiQI.\ ()f 
privacy in a locked glove compartment," id., and because the additional intrusion of a search o( p,l,lr~ 
sonal property is incidental "given the significant encroachment on privacy interests entail"g by a 
seizure of personal property .... " [d. at 770. (This last comment by Justice Blackmun, ho~"vex, 
was made in a case wherein the warrantless seizure of the suitcase did not violate the fourth amel.\c,I-
ment, because the police had probable cause to believe it contained contraband and beca':ls~ it migh~ 
have disappeared to an unknown location if police had delayed seizure until a warrant wl!-s ob~ainecl. 
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.) 
209. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13. 
210. [d. By implication, the Court was stating that the opening of such a contain,er would ~o~ 
be a fourth amendment search. See supra note 200, and infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
211. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. By implication, tl,le 
Court was saying that the contents of containers observed in plain view during the warrantless s(:arc,1,l 
of an automobile under the automobile exception can be seized without a warrant under the pll\h,l 
view seizure doctrine. See supra note 57. The Court has not, however, explicitly I,leld tha.~ ~h" 
warrantless seizure of items discovered during an automobile exception search must cOR,lply ~it\;\ ~Qc; 
plain view seizure doctrine in order to be upheld under the fourth amendment. But see T~x.lI.s v'., 
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). If, however, the plain view seizure doctrine must be cOR,lpli,€!Q wi~\;I ~o 
make such warrantless seizures valid under the fourth amendment, then the prior va.I.ici i.l).tr.IJ,S,IQn, 
requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine would be satisfied when the warrantless s,e\l,f£h Qf t.lw 
automobile is permissible in scope, see supra notes 180-91, because the warrant,less ~I\\r>;' Q('\\;\e, 
automobile would be valid under the automobile exception. See supra note 5,7. 'I:"h.~, ~t:ll!-.c!,<cenel.\t 
discovery requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine would be satisfied only ifthepolice !;lid no,t 
have probable cause to believe that the item seized would'be discovered witl,liQt,h.e'~~t:~W,Q~~\~: $t!~ 
supra notes 57 and 151 and text accompanying note 151. The inadvertent di~c.,?,~\:~y ~eq\l,~~emt!t:I,~ W!W 
not have to be complied with, however, when the item seized is contraband, or ~ dl!-.~,g~r<?,u,s, Q~ s,~"*1.\ 
item, or when exigent circumstances are present. See supra note 57. (A warrl!-n,~Ie.s~, s.€!\lr,<\\ 0(' ,,1.\ 
automobile, of course, is not permitted under the automobile' excepti,,?~ u,nl.es.s exigt;t:ll C;i,r-
cumstances are present. See supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text.), " . 
The exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless seizure and search of an automobile uncle~ 
the automobile exception, see supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text, however, are different 
from those that justify the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of a cOQtainer under 
Chadwick and Sanders. See supra notes 44-45, 207 and accompanying text. 
The third requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine, the immediately apparent require-
ment, would be satisfied if the police had probable cause to believe that the item seized had a nexus 
with criminal activity at the time they first discovered or observed the item. See supra note 57. 
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seized from an automobile. ,,212 In so doing, the Court implied that this 
dictum might be regarded as persuasive in all cases where the issue 
is whether, under Chadwick, a warrant is required to search an item 
of personal property. 
In two subsequent cases, Robbins v. California213 and United States 
v. Ross, 214 the Court has had to distinguish the types of containers and 
items of personal property subject to Chadwick's exclusive control stan-
dard and, therefore, requiring a search warrant from those not generally 
requiring a warrant. 
A majority of the Court in Robbins could not reach agreement on 
this issue. In Robbins, California Highway Patrol officers stopped an 
erratic driver of a station wagon. After one of the officers asked the 
driver of the stopped automobile, who had walked towards the patrol 
car, for his driver's license and the automobile's registration, W th~ 
driver" fumbled with his wallet. ,,216 Apparently the driver then returned 
to his automobile (the plurality's opinion is unclear on this point) accom~ 
panied by one of the officers and opened the door to get the automobile's 
registration. When he opened the door, the officer noticed the odor of 
burnt marijuana. An officer then patted down the automobile's owner, 
discovering and seizing a vial of liquid. He searched the interior of the 
station wagon, and discovered marijuana, as well as equipment for using 
212. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13. 
In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court limited the implications orthis stllll;1-
ment to searches of automobiles under the automobile exception where police have probllbl~ cIIYS~ 
to believe that a seizable item is in the personal luggage or container whose warrantless op~ni!ll! am! 
inspection is at issue. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text. See (lIsa United SIllies y, 
Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981). (Chadwick precludes police from openinl! !lnQ 
inventorying the contents of "personal baggage" such as purses that are discovered dllrlng an Invl,ln= 
tory search of an automobile pursuant to South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 <i976).) Cf, 
United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173 (2d Cir. 1981) (fourth amendment's protection dpes oPt 
apply to articles the finding of which in an automobile made the automobile subject tl) stllnngrY 
forfeiture, because defendant lost any expectation of privacy as to that article once It was sell"eli), 
The Sanders Court did not address the issue of whether the suitcase could have been s~lIn:h~d 
without a warrant as incident to the lawful arrest of its owner, although the Court did state thaI it 
"appears that the [suitcase) was not within his 'immediate control' at the time of the sellrch, " 442 
U.S. at 763 n. II. Consequently, the Court did not address the application of Chadwick 's e"c)!lsive 
control standard to the search of luggage or other containers discovered within an area within. the 
immediate control of an arrestee during a warrantless search of that area incident tp a lawflllIIrre§t. 
Cf. supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
213. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
214. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
215. In this situation, such a request is lawful without a warrant. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648 (1979). 
216. 453 U.S. at 422. 
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it. Then, after placing the automobile's driver in their patrol car, 217 the 
officers opened the tailgate of the station wagon and lifted up a handle set 
flush in the deck, revealing a recessed luggage compartment. The officers 
discovered inside this compartment two packages, each about the size of 
an "oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded corners and 
edges.' ,218 The packages were wrapped in green opaque plastic and sealed 
on the outside with at least one strip of opaque tape. 219 Without a war-
rant, the officers unwrapped these two packages and discovered about 15 
pounds of marijuana in each. The station wagon's owner was convicted 
of various drug offenses after his motion to suppress the marijuana as 
evidence was denied by the trial court. Six members of the Court agreed 
that the warrantless opening of the two packages in which marijuana was 
found, and the warrantless seizure of this marijuana, violated the fourth 
amendment, but a majority could not agree on the legal principles or the 
reasoning supporting this judgment. 
Justice Stewart, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices Brennan, 
White, and Marshall, although assuming that the warrantless stopping 
and search of the station wagon itself was permissible under the 
automobile exception, 220 concluded that Chadwick and Sanders prohibit 
the warrantless opening of such closed containers as the two packages 
wrapped in green opaque plastic at issue in Robbins, even though the 
containers are discovered during a search of an automobile permissible in 
scope under the automobile exception. 221 Justice Stewart rejected 
217. The patdown and seizure of the vial and the placing of the driver in the patrol car may 
arguably have constituted a lawful arrest of the driver and a lawful search of the driver's person inci-
dent to that arrest, see supra note 24, such that the warrantless search of the station wagon arguably 
may have been permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest under New York v. Belton, see 
supra notes 59-149 and accompanying text. However, the State in Robbins did not argue that the 
subsequent warrantless search of the interior of the station wagon and containers therein was inci-
dent to the lawful custodial arrest of the station wagon's driver. 453 U.S. at 429 n. 3. 
218. [d. at 422 n. I (citation omitted). 
219. [d. at 422 and 422 n. 1. 
220. [d. at 423. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart did not address 
the issue of whether the search of the recessed luggage compartment in the rear of the station wagon, 
after marijuana had been found in the wagon's passenger compartment, exceeded the permissible 
scope of a warrantless search of an automobile under the automobile exception. Justice Rehnquist 
implied in dissent in Robbins that the search of the recessed luggage compartment 
was permissible, because of the attendant circumstances: while the officers were retrieving the mari-
juana and other drug paraphernalia from the front of the car, the defendant said, "What you are 
looking for is in the back." 453 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). (Justice Stewart did not 
mention or analyze these facts in his plurality opinion in Robbins). See supra notes 190-91 and 
accompanying text. 
221. 453 U.S. at 428-29. 
Prior to Robbins, the vast majority of lower federal and state courts had held that the fourth 
amendment protects closed containers, but not open containers. See United States v. Cleary, 656 
F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1981) (Wright, J., dissenting). 
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arguments that Chadwick and Sanders require warrants only for the 
search of such "containers commonly used to transport 'personal 
effects' "222 as "sturdy" luggage (including suitcases), briefcases, duffle 
bags, backpacks, and tote bags,223 but permit warrantless searches of 
flimsier containers, such as cardboard boxes, paper bags, and plastic 
bags. 224 The Justice asserted that the fourth amendment, as interpreted 
in Chadwick and Sanders, prohibits the warrantless opening of any 
closed opaque container, 22 S whether the container is "personal" or 
"impersonal, "226 because such containers "reasonably 'manifested an 
expectation that the contents would remain free from public examina-
tion.' , '227 He did refer approvingly, however, to dicta in footnote 13 of 
Sanders to the effect that a warrantless search of a container is permitted 
if the contents of the container can be inferred from the container's 
shape, including, for example, a kit of burglar's tools or a gun case, 228 or 
if the contents of the container are in "plain view. "229 Justice Stewart 
asserted that "in short, the negative implication of footnote 13 of the 
Sanders opinion is that, unless the container is such that its contents may 
be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. ,,230 Justice Stewart then applied this reasoning to 
the facts in Robbins, concluding that the evidence presented at the defen-
222. 453 U.S. at 425-26. 
223. [d. 
224. [d. at 426. 
Such a distinction, which has been referred to as the "worthy container" rule, United States v. 
Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), had been followed by a number of 
lower courts prior to Robbins. See cases cited in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 426. 
225. 453 U.S. at 426. 
226. [d. 
227. [d., quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, II (1977). Justice Stewart appeared to 
be arguing here that the opening by police of a closed, opaque container is a fourth amendment 
search. See supra note 6, and see infra notes 298-319 and accompanying text. 
228. 442 U.S. at 764 n.l3. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text. According to Justice 
Stewart in Robbins, a container also would be within this exception under Chadwick if the container 
is transparent or otherwise reveals its contents. 453 U.S. at 428. 
229. 442 U.S. at 764 n. 13. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart 
argued that to be within Sanders' plain view exception, a container must not be closed. 453 U.S. at 
427. He also asserted that "expectations of privacy are established by general social norms, and to 
fall within the ... [Sanders plain view) exception ... a container must so clearly announce its con-
tents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are 
obvious to an observer." [d. at 428. He argued that the first exception under Sanders is "little more 
than another variation of the 'plain view' exception, since, if the distinctive configuration of a con-
tainer proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from a search-
ing officer's view .... " /d. at 427. 
230. [d. 
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dant's trial did not "reliably" indicate that the green plastic used to wrap 
the two packages "could only contain marijuana, "231 and, conse-
231. [d. at 428. Justice Stewart stated that the testimony at the defendant's trial of one of the 
officers who searched the defendant's automobile was "vague" and "somewhat" obscure, and did 
not establish that marijuana is ordinarily packaged as were the two packages in question. [d. (In the 
quoted testimony that Justice Stewart found to be vague, the officer, in response to a question as to 
whether there was anything about the two packages which attracted his attention, stated: "I had 
previous knowledge of transportation of such blocks. Normally contraband is wrapped this way, 
merely heresay [sic). I had never seen them before." The officer then replied "yes" when asked: 
"You had heard contraband was packaged this way?" [d. Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent in Rob-
bins, id. at 442, that after the officers had found marijuana in the passenger compartment of the sta-
tion wagon, the defendant said to the officer: "What you are looking for is in the back." (Justice 
Stewart did not refer to this fact in his opinion in Robbins.) Justice Rehnquist argued that this 
remark by the defendant, combined with the testimony at the defendant's trial of one of the officers 
who searched the defendant's station wagon that he was aware that contraband was often wrapped 
in plastic garbage bags, as were the two packages in question, created a permissible inference as to 
the contents of the two packages and denied the defendant a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of the two packages, with the result that their contents could be inspected without a war-
rant. [d. 
It might be argued that Justice Stewart meant that if the police have probable cause or reason to 
believe that the contents of a container, although not in plain view, are seizable items because they 
have a nexus with criminal activity, they may not only seize the container without a warrant but may 
also open and inspect the contents of the container without a warrant. Such an interpretation, 
however, is precluded by the determination in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) that Chad-
wick and Sanders govern the legality of a warrantless search of a container discovered in an 
automobile during a lawful automobile exception search when the container's contents are not in 
plain view and when the police have probable cause to believe there are seizable items within the con-
tainer. See infra notes 250-321 and accompanying text. 
In Blairv. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 507 (4th Cir. 1981), the court concluded that this plain 
view exception actually contains two parts. "First, if the container is open and its contents exposed, 
its contents can be said to be in plain view. Second, if a container proclaims its contents by its distinc-
tive configuration or otherwise and thus allows by its outward appearance an inference to be made 
of its contents, these contents are similarly considered to be in plain view .... In either instance, an 
investigating authority need not obtain a warrant to search the container, the reasoning behind the 
exception being that a warrant under those circumstances would be superfluous." Marijuana in 
burlap-covered bales on a vessel was held to be in plain view within the meaning of Robbins by the 
majority in Blair, because some of the bales were split open and marijuana exposed to view prior to 
the opening and sampling of the bales by law enforcement officials, because the other bales were 
almost identical in appearance to those that were split open, and because some of these other bales 
had marijuana residue on top of them. Thus authorities had sufficient evidence to infer "that the 
bales not split open also contained marijuana." [d. at 507. Judge Murnagham, dissenting in part 
and concurring in part in Blair, argued that the evidence established that bales were broken open by 
government agents, not by the occupants of the vessel, and that they were not broken open until the 
day after they were seized. [d. at 512 n. II (Murnagham, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). He also argued that to be in plain view under the plurality opinion in Robbins, a package must 
be open or have a configuration that is distinctive as to its contents, and that the contents of a 
package are not in plain view under the Robbins plurality opinion when the police have probable 
cause to believe that the contents of a package are seizable items, but the contents are not' 'revealed 
to the naked eye." Id. at 513. Applying this test to the facts, he concluded that the marijuana in the 
bales in question was not in plain view. [d. at 513-14. 
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quently, that the marijuana inside the closed, opaque containers could 
not be opened without a warrant under Chadwick and Sanders. 232 
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment in Robbins but did 
not issue an opinion explaining his reasons for concurring. 233 His major-
ity opinion in Chadwick, and his concurring opinion in Sanders, 
however, indicate that he would apply Chadwick's exclusive control stan-
dard to personal property other than personal luggage. In his opinion in 
Chadwick, he referred not only to luggage, but also to "personal posses-
sions,"234 "other personal property,"23~ and "letters and sealed 
packages"236 as containers that generally require a warrant before they 
can be opened and inspected. The Chief Justice, in his concurring 
opinion in Sanders, referred to "receptacle, "237 in addition to "trunk" 
and "suitcase," in discussing the application of Chadwick's exclusive 
control standard. Although these references in Chadwick and Sanders do 
not make explicitly clear how Chief Justice Burger would apply 
Chadwick's exclusive control standard to the various types of personal 
property and containers, they do indicate that he would generally require 
warrants to open at least some type of containers of personal property 
other than suitcases and luggage. 
Justice Powell also concurred in the Robbins judgment, but indi-
cated that he would permit warrantless searches of some types of 
containers that Justice Stewart would prohibit. Justice Powell argued 
that a warrant should be required to open and examine the contents of a 
container only if the container is one that generally serves as a repository 
for personal effects, or is an opaque, closed and sealed container 
manifesting an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy. 238 He 
expressed disagreement with the theory advocated in Justice Stewart's 
plurality opinion, which would, he asserted, require a warrant to open 
and inspect the contents of any closed, opaque container, regardless of its 
size or shape, or other evidence suggesting that the container's owner was 
asserting a privacy interest in the contents. 239 Justice Powell argued that 
his approach "resembles in principle the inquiry courts must undertake 
232. None of the Justices in Robbins argued that the two packages were not in the exclusive 
control of the police or that there were exigent circumstances present; in either of these situations, 
under Chadwick and Sanders, a warrant would not have been required to open the two packages. 
See supra notes 36-58 and 195-212 and accompanying text. 
233. 453 U.S. at 429. 
234. 433 U.S. at II. 
235. Id. at 15. 
236. Id. at 10 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878». 
237. 442 U.S. at 767. 
238. 453 U.S. at 432-33. 
239. Id. at 429 n.!. 
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to determine whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
complaining party,,,240 but that Justice Stewart's approach "departs 
from this basic concern with interests in privacy, and adopts a mechanical 
requirement for a warrant before police may search any closed 
container."241 According to Justice Powell, application of Justice 
Stewart's approach would result in the unjustified expenditure of time 
and effort of police and magistrates in obtaining warrants authorizing 
the search of the "most trivial container, ,,242 such as a "cigar box" or "a 
Dixie cup, ,,243 and the detention in some cases of suspects and vehicles 
for "hours. ,,244 
Justice Powell indicated that he would not require the police to have 
a warrant to inspect the contents of a plastic cup or a brown paper grocery 
sack. 245 As noted earlier, Justice Stewart and the three other members of 
the plurality had indicated that they would require a warrant to search a 
closed paper bag. 246 Justice Powell indicated, on the other hand, that 
cardboard boxes and laundry bags are ambiguous containers which may 
or may not, depending upon the circumstances of each case, manifest a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. 247 
Under his approach, a court, in determining whether a warrant is needed 
to inspect the contents of an ambiguous container, should consider' 'the 
size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context within 
which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken some signifi-
cant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing, or binding the con-
tainer, that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being 
displayed upon simple mischance. ,,248 Applying this test to the facts in 
Robbins, Justice Powell argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
had been manifested in the two packages in question, because they had 
been securely wrapped and sealed, and, therefore, that a warrant was 
required to open and inspect the contents of the two packages. 249 
240. [d. at 432. 
241. [d. at 433. 
242. [d. at 433-34. 
243. [d. at 433. 
244. [d. 
245. [d. at 434 n.3. 
246. 453 U.S. at 426. In Ross v. United States, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court was required to 
determine if a warrant is required to open and inspect the contents of a closed paper bag. See infra 
notes 250-321 and accompanying text. 
247. 453 U.S. at 434 n. 3. 
248. /d. at 435. 
249. /d. Justice Powell indicated that he might be willing in the future to adopt the viewpoint of 
the three dissenters (Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens) that police, under the automobile 
exception, should be permitted to open and inspect the contents of every container found within an 
automobile. He declined to do so, because the "parties have not pressed this argument in this case 
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Less than a year after Robbins, a majority of the Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Ross,2S0 rejected "the precise holding in Robbins"2S1 
and the approaches used by Justices Stewart and Powell to determine 
when the opening and inspection of a particular container are regulated 
by the fourth amendment. Ross held that under the automobile excep-
tion, when police have the right to make a warrantless search of an 
automobile they have probable cause to believe contains seizable items 
but do not know where in the automobile the items will be found, they 
may search without a warrant all areas of the automobile and all con-
tainers therein which could contain the items. In Ross, the police had 
probable cause, based on an informant's tip, to believe that the 
defendant's automobile contained narcotics in the trunk, although the 
informant did not identify a specific container in which the narcotics 
would be found. 252 Soon after receiving this tip, the police stopped the 
and it is late in the term for us to undertake sua sponte reconsideration of basic doctrines." Jd. at 
435. Justice Powell did, in fact, change his position in this manner less than a year later, by con-
curring and joining in the Court's opinion in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra 
notes 250-321 and accompanying text. 
Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Robbins that, because police obtain a warrant authorizing 
them to search any container in an automobile when they have probable cause to believe seizable 
items are hidden in them, then, under the automobile exception, the police should be allowed to con-
duct such a search without a warrant. 453 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued that "the 
scope of any search that is within the exception should be just as broad as a magistrate could 
authorize by warrant if he were on the scene; the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
therefore justifies neither more nor less than could a magistrate's warrant." Jd. at 448-49. He stated, 
however, that this container rule should apply only when the police have probable cause to believe 
that a seizable item will be found somewhere in an automobile, but not when the police have prob-
able cause to believe that the seizable item is in a specific container in the automobile (which, he 
noted, was the case in Chadwick and Sanders). Jd. at 449. He implied that the automobile exception 
should apply only when the police have probable cause to believe that an item is located somewhere 
in the automobile, but not when the police have probable cause to believe that the item is located in a 
specific container. Jd. Justice Stevens' dissent in Robbins became the position of a majority of the 
Court less than one year later in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra notes 250-321 
and accompanying text. 
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent in Robbins, as he had argued in New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), should be 
overruled so that the States would no longer be subject to the exclusionary rule. 453 U.S. at 437-39. 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
250. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
251. Jd. at 824. 
252. Jd. at 817 n.22. The Court, however, did not address the question of whether the infor-
mant's tip satisfied the probable cause standard that was applicable at the time - the "two-
pronged" basis of knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), 
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An 
Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974). The Court subsequently decided to 
"abandon the 'two-pronged test' established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli, "Illinois v. 
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983), adopting in its place a less strict' 'totality of the circumstances 
analysis" for determining when there is probable cause to believe that seizable items will be found in 
a particular place. Id. 
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automobile without a warrant on a public street and arrested the defen-
dant. 253 They then searched the trunk, in which they found a brown 
paper bag. A police officer opened the bag and discovered in it severa1 
glassine bags containing a white powder that a police laboratory later 
determined to be heroin. 254 At the police station, the police, still without 
a warrant, discovered in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. They 
opened the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash, which they seized. The 
defendant was charged with the crime of posession of heroin with intent 
to distribute, a violation of 21 U .S.C. § 841(a) (1976). Prior to his trial, 
the defendant made a motion to suppress as evidence the heroin seized 
from the paper bag and the money seized from the leather pouch. The 
district court denied this motion, after which the defendant was con-
victed of the crime. 
A majority of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc, held that the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of 
both the paper bag and the leather pouch violated the fourth 
amendment. 255 The court justified its holding on the grounds that war-
rants are generally required, and that there is no exception to this rule that 
would permit the warrantless opening and inspection of "unworthy" 
containers. The majority further argued that determining the validity of a 
warrantless search of a container on the basis of the container's dur-
ability would impose "an unreasonable and unmanageable burden 
on police and courts, ,,256 and that the fourth amendment should protect 
253. The Court in Ross did not discuss whether the exigent circumstances requirement of the 
automobile exception was satisfied. The Court, however, has always found this requirement to be 
satisfied when police stop an automobile on a public road, even when the police have probable cause 
to believe that the automobile would be found in a specific location (see supra note 159 and accom-
panying text, and Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), discussed therein) as was the case in 
Ross, 456 U.S. at 801. 
254. [d. The Court in Ross did not discuss the issue of whether the seizure of the heroin com-
plied with the plain view seizure doctrine, see supra note 57. Arguably, the immediately apparent 
requirement of the plain view seizure doctrine may not have been satisfied, because the facts of Ross 
indicate that the white powder was not determined to be heroin until tested later by a police 
laboratory. See supra note 57. 
255. 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
This decision followed an unreported decision by a divided three-judge panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.C. Cir. 
April 17, 1980). This decision was later vacated and a rehearing en bane was held on October 23, 
1980. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The three-judge panel 
concluded that the fourth amendment validity of the warrantless search of a container discovered 
during an automobile exception search depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in its contents. Applying this test, the majority of the panel held that the 
warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of the leather pouch violated the fourth amend-
ment, but that the opening and inspection of the contents of the paper bag did not. [d. 
256. [d. at 1161. 
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all persons, not just persons "with the resources or fastidiousness to 
place their effects in containers that decision makers would rank in 
the luggage line."m The majority rejected the argument that the war-
rantless searches of the paper bag and leather pouch were valid because 
the warrantless search of the automobile was permissible under the 
automobile exception. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless opening 
and inspection of the contents of the paper bag and leather pouch did not 
exceed the permissible scope of a warrantless search of an automobile 
under the automobile exception. Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by 
the Chief Justice and four other Associate Justices, reasoned that the 
automobile exception permits police, when they have probable cause to 
believe only that seizable items are located somewhere in the automobile, 
to search without a warrant all areas of the automobile and containers 
within the automobile within which the items could be hidden.258 He 
stated, however, that "probable cause to believe that a container placed 
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a 
search of the entire cab."m Justice Stevens explained that the permis-
sible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception' 'is no 
greater than a magistrate could have authorized by issuing a warrant 
based on the probable cause that justified the search, ,,260 and that in 
previous automobile exception cases before the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts it had never been argued or held, until Chadwick, 
Sanders, and Robbins, that police could not open and inspect containers 
discovered within areas of an automobile lawfully searched under the 
automobile exception. 261 
He further indicated that permitting a warrantless search of the vehi-
cle itself (including its upholstery) while prohibiting the warrantless 
opening and inspection of the contents of all wrapped articles found 
within the vehicle "would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy 
257. [d. 
258. Justice Stevens indicated that under the automobile exception, police, in addition to 
searching containers found within the automobile, may rip open upholstery without a warrant, 456 
U.S. at 818, 823 (at least when the upholstery feels harder than is ordinarily the case, id. at 804 
quoting from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 174), and may also search concealed or hidden 
compartments, 456 U.S. at 818,825, and the glove compartment. [d. at 821, 823. 
259. [d. at 824. 
260. [d. at 818. Justice Stevens also stated that the Court's holding "neither broadened nor 
limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause," id. at 820. He noted that a search war-
rant explicitly authorizing only the search of a building permits a search of desks, chests, cabinets, 
and drawers, and that a warrant authorizing search of a vehicle permits' 'a search of every part of the 
vehicle that might contain the object of the search." [d. at 821. 
261. [d. at 819. 
1983] WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF AUTOMOBILES 57 
interests"262 and would interfere with the "prompt and efficient com-
pletion" of the search of the vehicle.263 He reasoned here that "the 
vehicle would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained,,,264 
since "until the container itself was opened the police could never be 
certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered por-
tion of the vehicle. ,,265 
It could be argued contra, however, that although exigent cir-
cumstances may justify the warrantless stopping and search of an 
automobile and the seizure of containers found therein, a warrant should 
be required to search such containers once they are within the exclusive 
control of the police266 unless exigent circumstances are present. 267 As 
noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Ross, 268 although integral com-
partments of a car are just as mobile as the car, moveable containers 
located within the car are not, and do not present the same practical prob-
lems of safekeeping as does the car. The rule adopted by the majority in 
Ross does not allow police searching an automobile to make a war-
rantless search greater in scope than would be permitted by a warrant. 
Still, there remains the danger noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent: 269 
if probable cause is determined after, rather than prior to, the opening 
and inspection of the contents of a container, probable cause will be 
found in borderline situations where highly probative items were seized 
during the warrantless search of the container, even though information 
available prior to the search would have been insufficient for such a find-
262. [d. at 821 n.28. 
263. [d. at 821. 
264. [d. at 821 n.28. 
265. [d. Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the police would only have to seize the con-
tainer while a warrant is being obtained, id. at 831 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He failed to note, 
as did the majority in Ross, that the car would also have to be detained until the container was 
searched, because of the possibility that the items to be seized were in unsearched areas of the car 
rather than in the container. Justice Marshall also stated that police could continue to search a car 
for seizable items even though a container was found to have seizable items inside, id. at 838, but 
cited no authority for this position. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. He did state later 
in his dissent that "if police open a container within a car and find contraband, they may acquire 
probable cause to believe that other portions of the car, and other containers within it, will contain 
contraband," id. at 842 n. 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(which would allow such other portions and 
containers to be searched without a warrant, see supra note 200 and accompanying text), but he did 
not explain how such probable cause would be acquired. See supra note 191. 
266. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra notes 44-45, 205 and accompanying text. 
Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in Ross that no exigent circumstances were present in the 
case because Ross had been arrested and was in custody when both searches at issue occurred and 
because the police succeeded in transporting the bag to the station without inadvertently spilling its 
contents. 456 U.S. at 835. 
268. [d. at 837-38. 
269. [d. at 829. 
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ing. Justice Marshall also argued that the majority erred in permitting the 
scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception to be as 
broad as the scope of a search authorized by a magistrate pursuant to a 
warrant. He noted that "an officer on the beat who searches an 
automobile without a warrant is not entitled to conduct a broader search 
than the exigency obviating the warrant justifies, ,,270 but he failed to note 
that, although the general rule is that warrantless searches and seizures 
are permitted only when exigent circumstances are present/71 war-
rantless searches and seizures are permitted in some circumstances when 
exigent circumstances are not present if the interests served by such war-
rantless searches sufficiently outweigh the infringements upon privacy 
interests resulting therefrom. Such warrantless searches do not violate 
the fourth amendment. 272 Although exigent circumstances may not be 
present in most cases when the warrantless opening and inspection of 
containers take place under the holding of Ross, that case may authorize 
searches reasonable under the fourth amendment under this balancing 
test, because, as argued by Justice Blackmun273 and Powell274 in their 
concurring opinion, it provides clear guidance to police, courts, and the 
public as to the authority of police to act without a warrant under the 
automobile exception, while interfering only to a limited extent with a 
person's privacy. 275 
The Supreme Court also said in Ross that "the Fourth Amendment 
provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its con-
tents from plain view. ,,276 This statement authorizes the warrantless 
270. [d. at 833. 
271. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
272. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (warrantless stopping of an 
automobile and brief investigative questioning of occupants by immigration officials at fixed check-
point away from international border, when there was no reason to believe the automobile con-
tained illegal aliens, upheld as not in violation of the fourth amendment because law enforcement 
needs outweighed minimal intrusions on privacy); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) 
(warrantless administrative inspection searches of "pervasively regulated" industries pursuant to 
statutory authorization permitted when there is clear notice of when and under what procedures 
such searches will take place.) 
273. 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
274. [d. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring). 
275. Such an argument is similar to that of the majority of the Supreme Court in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in support of its per se rule authorizing the warrantless search of the 
passenger compartment of an automobile and the containers therein when that search is incident to 
the lawful arrest of an occupant of the automobile. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text. 
276. 456 U.S. at 822-23. Justice Stevens did not explain when the contents of a container would 
be in plain view, but the reference is probably meant to refer to the definition of this term in Justice 
Stewart's plurality opinion in Robbins, 453 U.S. at 427 (plurality opinion), which Justice Stevens 
identified as the source of his conclusion that the fourth amendment applies to all containers that 
conceal their contents from plain view. See supra notes 215-32 and accompanying text. 
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search of all containers within an automobile under the automobile 
exception, regardless of whether the container is "worthy" or 
"unworthy" even when the police have probable cause only to believe 
that the items to be seized are somewhere in the car, but not in any specific 
container within the automobile. 277 This overrules Robbins.278 Justice 
Stevens' opinion in Ross also implicitly rejects Justice Powell's approach 
in Robbins on the issue of when the fourth amendment regulates the 
opening and inspection of containers, when it states that "the central 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses ... a distinction"279 
which is "based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects 
only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy. ,,280 The Court noted that if such a distinc-
tion were adopted, "the propriety of a warrantless search necessarily 
would turn on much more than the fabric of the container. A paper bag 
stapled shut and marked 'private' might be found to manifest a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box stacked on 
top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless 
search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the sur-
rounding circumstances. ,,281 By rejecting a "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test for determining the application ofthe fourth amendment to 
the opening and inspection of the contents of containers, the majority in 
Ross implicitly rejected Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Robbins, 
which advocated such a test. 282 In support of the conclusion that the 
fourth amendment foreclosed a distinction between worthy and 
unworthy containers and a test based on an objective appraisal of all sur-
rounding circumstances, Justice Stevens in Ross stated that "just as the 
most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same 
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also maya 
277. [d. at 822. Although the Court in Ross did not say so, the effect of this statement is to 
make the containers subject to search under Ross pursuant to the automobile exception identical to 
those subject to search under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), pursuant to the search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest exception. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. 
278. As noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Ross, the application of this definition of 
containers subject to the fourth amendment's protection to the rule adopted in Ross results in a loss 
by all citizens of the protection of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 456 U.S. at 843. 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the Ross Court's holding with respect to the fourth 
amendment's applicability to containers extends the protection of the fourth amendment's warrant 
requirement in other contexts. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
279. 456 U.S. at 822. 
280. [d. at 822 n. 30. 
281. [d. 
282. See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. Justice Powell also implicitly rejected his 
concurring opinion in Robbins by concurring in Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Ross. 
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traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper 
bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from 
official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attache 
case. ,,283 Although Justice Stevens in Ross rejected Justice Powell's case 
by case approach in Robbins, he did note that "the protection afforded 
by the Fourth Amendment varies in different settings. "284 More 
specifically, he stated that "an individual's expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to 
believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Certainly the privacy 
interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those 
in a movable container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant 
interest that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or a hid-
den compartment within it opened. These interests must yield to the 
authority of a search, however, which-in light of Carroll-does not 
require the prior approval of a magistrate. ,,28S 
The Court in Ross did adhere to the holding in Sanders, 286 
distinguishing Chadwick and Sanders, in which cases the police had 
probable cause to believe that seizable items were located in the locked 
footlocker and the suitcase, respectively, from Ross, wherein the police 
had probable cause to believe only that the seizable items were located 
somewhere in the automobile's trunk, but did not have reason to 
believe that the seizable items were located in any specific container. 287 
Justice Stevens, in fact, approvingly quoted and adopted Chief Justice 
Burger's argument in his concurring opinion in Sanders288 to the effect 
that the automobile exception under Carroll was not applicable to the 
facts in Sanders. Consequently, because the fourth amendment 
regulates the opening and inspection of any container discovered within 
283. 456 U.S. at 822 (footnote omitted). 
284. Justice Stevens elaborated on this statement as follows: 
The luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at random by a 
customs officer; the luggage may be searched no matter how great the traveler's desire 
to conceal the contents may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may be 
searched without a warrant and even without any specific suspicion concerning its con-
tents. A container that may conceal the object of a search authorized by a warrant may be 
opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must give way to the magistrate's 
official determination of probable cause. 
456 U.S. at 823. 
285. [d. 
286. [d. at 824. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
287. [d. at 816. See United States v. Place, 51 U.S.L.W. 4844, 4845 n.3 (U.S. June 20,1983) 
(the Court's holding in Sanders that " ... the police violated the Fourth Amendment in immediately 
searching the luggage rather than first obtaining a warrant authorizing the search ... was not 
affected by ... United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).") 
288. 442 U.S. at 766-67. See supra note 196. 
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an automobile (provided its contents are not in plain view),289 police 
will continue to need a warrant to open and inspect the contents of a 
container they have probable cause to believe contains seizable items 
and whose contents are not in plain view290 unless the container is not 
within the exclusive control of the police291 or there are exigent cir-
cumstances present. 292 
Furthermore, because Ross' holding with respect to the fourth 
amendment's applicability to the opening and inspection of the contents 
of containers is not limited to the specific factual situations involved in 
that case, it implicitly extends the Chadwick and Sanders exclusive con-
trol and exigent circumstances standards to containers whose contents 
are not in plain view when they are discovered within the area of imme-
diate control of a person lawfully arrested. 293 The Court in Ross, 
however, did not cite or discuss the applicability of its holding to the rule 
established in Belton294 that authorized the warrantless search of all con-
tainers within the passenger compartment of an automobile when an 
occupant has been lawfully arrested. 295 The definition of container under 
Belton, however, is identical to the definition of container under Ross. 296 
Some aspects of Justice Powell's approach in his concurring opinion 
in Robbins, such as the requirement that a container be sealed as well as 
closed in order to be protected by the fourth amendment297 and the state-
ment that the opening of a paper bag never requires a warrant, 298 will not 
receive universal acceptance. On the other hand, his approach to deter-
mine when the opening of a container and the inspection of its contents 
will be considered to violate a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus 
289. The determination in Ross that the fourth amendment regulates the opening and inspec-
tion of the contents of any container, whether worthy or unworthy, whose contents are not in plain 
view, was not limited to the situation presented by the facts in Ross, but appears to be intended to 
apply to all situations where the legality of the search of a container is at issue. See infra notes 291-94 
and accompanying text. 
290. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text. 
291. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 44-45, 205 and accompanying text. 
Justice Marshall asserted in his dissent in Ross that Ross requires the Government to "show 
that the investigating officer knew enough but not too much, that he had sufficient knowledge to 
establish probable cause but insufficient knowledge to know exactly where the contraband was 
located." 456 U.S. at 840 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 
1202 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting». 
293. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text. 
294. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
295. See supra notes 59-149 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 275. 
297. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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constitute a fourth amendment search, might be better received. 299 This 
approach focuses on the location of a container within an automobile 
and the circumstances under which it was discovered by police, as well as 
the nature and design of the container. This view is more consistent with 
traditional fourth amendment principles than Justice Stevens' majority 
opinion in Ross or Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Robbins. In his 
concurring opinion in Robbins, Justice Powell properly recognized that 
the initial issue presented in such cases is whether the warrantless opening 
and inspection of the contents of a container or other item of personal 
property is a fourth amendment search (i.e., violates an actual and 
reasonable expectation of privacy300), regardless of which exception to 
the rule generally requiring a warrant justified the warrantless search of 
the automobile in which the container was found. The fourth amend-
ment "protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures";301 containers or other items of personal property are not 
themselves protected by the fourth amendment,302 as Justice Stewart's 
opinion in Robbins implied. 303 
Although the plurality opinion in Robbins refers to reasonable 
expectations of privacy, 304 that opinion ultimately concluded that partic-
ular types of containers and items of personal property-closed, opaque 
containers-are protected by the fourth amendment, 30S regardless of the 
circumstances present at the time the container is seized and searched. 306 
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Ross, although it referred to the 
fourth amendment's protection for "the owner of every container that 
conceals its contents from plain view,' >307 adopted a per se rule making 
the fourth amendment applicable to all containers whose contents are not 
in plain view, regardless of "an objective appraisal of all the surrounding 
circumstances. "308 Justice Stewart in Robbins, Justice Powell in Rob-
299. See supra note 3. 
300. See supra note 6. 
301. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
302. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
303. Justice Stewart argued that the fourth amendment prohibits the warrantless opening of 
any closed opaque container. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. This theory focused 
only on the nature of the container. 
304. 453 U.S. at 426-28. 
305. Id. at 428. See supra note 303. 
306. Cj. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434 n. 3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring), dis-
cussed supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. 
307. 456 U.S. at 822-23. 
308. Id. 822 at n. 30. 
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bins, 309 and Justice Stevens in his majority opinion in Ross, failed to con-
sider that a person may have a reasonable or legitimate expectation that a 
container will not be opened and its contents inspected in some cir-
cumstances, but not in other circumstances. For instance, a person has 
no actual or legitimate expectation of privacy in property that he has 
abandoned,31O with the result that governmental opening, inspection, 
and seizing of the contents of an abandoned container discovered in an 
abandoned automobile are not regulated by the fourth amendment. 311 
Similarly, the majority of courts hold that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the contents of trash that has been set out on a 
curb for collection and disposal, and a fourth amendment search 
therefore does not occur if police open and inspect the contents of con-
tainers set out for trash. 312 By analogy, and as implied by Justice Powell's 
reference in Robbins to "the context in which [an ambiguous container] 
is discovered," 313 a person might legitimately have a greater expectation 
of privacy in a container placed in a locked trunk or glove compartment 
of an automobile than in a similar container placed on the seat of an 
unlocked passenger compartment of an automobile with the windows 
rolled down. 314 As noted by Justice Powell in Robbins, the determination 
of whether the opening and inspection of the contents of a particular con-
tainer constitutes a fourth amendment search should be based upon a 
consideration of "the size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior 
of the container, the context within which it is discovered, and whether 
the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as locking, 
securing, sealing or binding that container, that indicates a desire to pre-
309. 453 U.S. at 454 n. 3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). 
310. See W. LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 2.6 (b). 
311. See id., § 2.5 (a). 
312. E.g., United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Alden, 576 
F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855. A minority of courts hold that people have a 
reasonable expectation that the contents of trash will be handled only by trash collectors, not 
inspected by police; and will be mingled with other trash and incinerated or otherwise disposed of, 
not retained and sifted by law enforcement officials. See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. 
Rptr. 62, 486P.2d 1262 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd after remand, 8 Cal. 
3d 623,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973). See W. LA FAVE, 
supra note 6, § 2.6 (c). 
313. 453 U.S. at 434 n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
314. Similarly, the majority of courts hold that a person has a legitimate expectation that police 
will not look into the passenger compartment of an automobile parked within the curtilage of his 
home, see, e.g., United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974), but does not have a 
legitimate expectation that police will not look into the inside of an automobile's passenger compart-
ment when the automobile is located in a public place, e.g. Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 
1973), even if the policeman's observations are made at night with the aid of a flashlight. E.g., State 
v. Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 215 N.W. 2d 535 (1974). 
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vent the contents from being displayed upon simple mischance. ,,31 S This 
approach should be followed regardless of whether the container in ques-
tion was found during a warrantless search of an automobile pursuant to 
the automobile exception, Belton's search incident to a lawful arrest 
exception, or some other exception to the rule generally requiring a war-
rant for a search. It should be noted, however, that the exception that 
justified the warrantless search of the automobile in question may be rele-
vant to the determination of whether a person had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the container and its contents. 316 
Justice Stewart's opinion in Robbins also failed to distinguish 
between the issue of whether the opening and inspection of the contents 
of a container is a fourth amendment search and the issue of whether such 
conduct by the police without a warrant violates the fourth amendment. 
Justice Stevens' analysis in Ross fails, as did Justice Stewart's analysis in 
Robbins, to distinguish two superficially similar but actually distinct 
issues. The first is whether the opening and inspection of the contents of a 
container constitute a fourth amendment search; and the second is 
whether such conduct is an unreasonable search that violates the fourth 
amendment. The various situations cited by Justice Stevens in Ross as 
examples of how the protection afforded by the fourth amendment varies 
in different settings 317 are situations in which a search with or without a 
warrant was held not to be unreasonable in violation of the fourth 
amendment. They are not situations in which the police conduct was held 
not to be a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
Only if the opening and inspection of the contents of a container are 
determined to constitute a fourth amendment search is a court required 
315. 453 U.S. at 434 n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring). See Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967 
(4th Cir. 1981); Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Pillo, 522 
F .Supp. 855 (M.D. Pa. 1981). In addition, as noted earlier, see supra note 6, the opening and inspec-
tion of the contents of a container may violate one person's fourth amendment's rights, but not 
those of a third party. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (I 980)(defendant in a criminal trial 
does not have standing to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained from a third person's 
briefcase through an intentional violation of that third person's fourth amendment rights). 
316. For example, the driver of an automobile who had robbed a bank, put the proceeds in a 
paper bag, and put the bag in his car, should have a correspondingly lesser legitimate expectation of 
privacy in that bag than the driver of an automobile arrested for speeding would have in the privacy 
of the contents of paper bags discovered in the automobile during a search incident to his lawful 
arrest under Belton. Cf Graham v. State, 47 Md. App. 287, 421 A.2d 1385 (thief of recently stolen 
container has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that container and consequently has no stand-
ing to challenge police seizure and inspection of the contents of that container). 
317. See supra no:.:s 284-85 and accompanying text. 
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to determine if such police conduct was reasonable under the fourth 
amendment, and if a warrant and probable cause were required and were 
present if required. 318 If the opening and inspection of the contents of a 
container by police do amount to a fourth amendment search, and such a 
warrantless search is not lawful under Ross, the determination of 
whether the search was reasonable under the fourth amendment should 
be determined by application of Chadwick's and Sanders' exclusive con-
trol and exigent circumstances standards319 regardless of whether the 
container was discovered during an automobile exception search or a 
search under Belton. The exigent circumstances that justify the war-
rantless stopping and seizure of an automobile,320 do not, however, 
necessarily establish an exigency that justifies the warrantless search of a 
container that is within the exclusive control of the police. 321 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There can be cases where police officers without a search or arrest 
warrant have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains 
seizable items, under circumstances such that a warrantless stop and 
search of the automobile is permissible under the automobile exception, 
but where the occupants of the automobile cannot be arrested without a 
warrant. 322 In such cases, because the occupants of the automobile can-
not be arrested lawfully, the automobile cannot be searched without a 
warrant incident to a lawful arrest under Chimel and Belton, although it 
can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception. 323 
318. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). If such police conduct is not a fourth amendment 
search, such conduct is not regulated by the fourth amendment's reasonableness, warrant or prob-
able cause requirements. [d. 
319. See supra notes 36-58, 195-212 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra notes 152-76 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 44-45, 205 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, see supra notes 
195-212 and accompanying text, the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979), ruled 
that whether the warrantless opening and inspection of the contents of containers discovered in 
an automobile were reasonable under the fourth amendment is determined by application of 
the general rules developed under the fourth amendment's warrant clause and not the exception 
to the rule. 
322. An arrest warrant is required in many jurisdictions when the police have probable cause to 
believe that the occupants committed a misdemeanor out of their presence. See W. LA FAVE, supra 
note 6, § 5.1 (b), (c). 
323. This was apparently the situation in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See W. 
LA FAVE, supra note 6, § 7.2(a) at 511. 
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When a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under the 
automobile exception, a prompt search of the automobile may result in 
the seizure of contraband or evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of 
crime that otherwise would not be recovered by law enforcement offi-
cials. When a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted under 
Chimel and Belton because the occupants of the automobile have been 
lawfully arrested, a warrantless search of the automobile may prevent the 
loss of evidence or forestall injury to the arresting officers or members of 
the public. The arrested occupants might, for example, reenter the 
automobile to obtain evidence or weapons hidden inside. Consequently, 
to prevent loss of evidence and other seizable items and to protect the 
safety of police officers and members of the public, there are reasonable 
grounds for recognizing these two independent exceptions to the rule 
generally requiring a warrant for a search or seizure-the "automobile 
exception", and Belton's search incident to a lawful arrest exception. 
Under either of these two exceptions, the validity of a warrantless 
search of an automobile should be decided on a case by case basis. The 
validity of a warrantless search under the automobile exception should 
depend on a finding of probable cause to believe there were seizable items 
in the automobile and the presence of exigent circumstances that would 
make it impracticable or dangerous for the police to have obtained a war-
rant. The validity of a warrantless search when incident to the lawful 
arrest of one or more occupants of the automobile should depend on a 
finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the arrested 
occupant(s) may have been able to enter the automobile and seize a 
weapon or evidence prior to being transported to a police station or jail. 
This determination should be based upon the number of arrested occu-
pants, the number of arresting officers, the degree of physical restraint to 
which the arrested occupants were subject at the time of the search, the 
geographical location of the arrested occupants in relation to the 
automobile at the time it was searched, and the design of the automobile 
that was searched. Although the Belton and Ross rules may provide clear-
cut guidance to police as to their lawful authority and to members of the 
public as to their constitutional rights, these rules also authorize searches 
of areas of automobiles and containers in the automobile when there is 
absolutely no danger that an occupant of the automobile or anyone else 
could gain access to that area or container. 
There are, however, practical alternatives to the Belton rule that 
would protect the safety of the police and members of the public and 
preserve evidence that may be in the automobile. They include authoriz-
ing police to handcuff all lawfully arrested occupants of an automobile 
and lock the persons in a police vehicle; to take any containers found 
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within the automobile and temporarily lock them in the trunk of that 
automobile or a police vehicle until a warrant is obtained or until the 
arrested occupants are released from police custody; to lock the 
automobile and have it towed to a police impoundment lot; and to have 
one of the arresting officers (if there is more than one) or a police officer 
in a back-up unit drive the automobile to a police impoundment lot. In 
addition, for the purposes of protection of human safety and preserva-
tion of evidence, police also might be authorized to lock occupants of an 
automobile not arrested in a police vehicle temporarily, or to otherwise 
res~rain those occupants until after arrested occupants of the automobile 
are removed from the scene or additional police officers arrive. A rule 
authorizing such alternate types of warrantless conduct by police after 
lawfully arresting occupants of an automobile would provide clear-cut 
guidance both to the police and to the public as to the authority of the 
police; would protect the safety of police and members of the public; and 
would prevent evidence that may be in the automobile from being con-
cealed, removed, or destroyed by arrested occupants, non-arrested occu-
pants, or members of the public. Moreover, it would prevent unnecessary 
invasions of personal privacy to a greater extent than does the Belton 
rule, and would, therefore, be more consistent with the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures than is the rule 
adopted in Belton. 
Furthermore, the validity of police conduct in opening and inspect-
ing without a warrant the contents of a container found within an 
automobile during a lawful warrantless search under Belton should be 
based on a determination of whether such conduct violated an actual and 
legitimate expectation of privacy. That is, the validity of the conduct will 
depend on whether it constituted a fourth amendment search, and, if so, 
whether the police had the container within their exclusive control and 
whether there were exigent circumstances. 
On the other hand, in the case of an automobile exception search, 
the standard adopted in Ross should determine the validity of a war-
rantless fourth amendment search of a container. The effect of this 
would be that Ross would govern cases in which the police have probable 
cause to believe only that seizable items are located somewhere in the 
automobile, and Sanders would govern situations in which the police 
have probable cause to believe the seizable item is in a specific container. 
When Ross applies, it will be reasonable to allow police to open and 
inspect without a warrant the contents of containers which could hold 
seizable items, because the alternative of having police impound the 
automobile and the containers until a search warrant is obtained would 
place an unreasonable burden on police and magistrates, and would 
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interfere with privacy interests to an equal or greater extent than would 
the immediate warrantless search of the containers. Although there is the 
danger under Ross that probable cause may be found after a search when 
it would not be found prior to the search, neutral and detached 
magistrates should be trusted to avoid such consequences. 
